Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial Hierarchy by Boyd, Christina
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs)
January 2009
Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial
Hierarchy
Christina Boyd
Washington University in St. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in All
Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boyd, Christina, "Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial Hierarchy" (2009). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 43.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/43
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Political Science
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Andrew D. Martin, Chair
Pauline T. Kim
Margo Schlanger
James F. Spriggs, II
Matthew Gabel
Melanie J. Springer
Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial Hierarchy
by
Christina L. Boyd, J.D.
A dissertation presented to the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
August 2009
St. Louis, Missouri
copyright by
Christina L. Boyd
2009
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Placing Federal District Courts in the Judicial Hierarchy
by
Christina L. Boyd
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2009
Andrew D. Martin, Chair
Over forty years after Richardson and Vines (1967) complained that federal courts
“have seldom been investigated as a system of interactions,” the same problem con-
tinues to plague judicial scholarship, particularly concerning federal district courts.
Viewed as the sum of its three essays, this dissertation project seeks to remedy this
deficit. The project relies on the collection and coding of thousands of case dockets,
opinions, and other court documents across multiple years (2000-2006 for essay 1,
2000-2004 for essays 2 and 3), nearly 30 district courts, and numerous issues areas
that together account for about 40% of federal district court civil filings.
The project evaluates three questions related to placing placing district courts in
the judicial hierarchy. Question 1 tests the influence of case developments and actor
characteristics on the disposition method (settlement, non-trial adjudication, and
trial) and winning party in district court civil cases. With Question 2, I examine
what features lead to a change in a case’s winning party and disposition method
after the case has been appealed and remanded back to the district court. Finally,
Question 3 models the decision of a losing litigant to appeal to the courts of appeals
and captures the implications of this decision for the outcome of the case on appeal.
The result is that this project provides unprecedented insights into the develop-
ment of law, the strategies of parties, the managerial role of judges, the influence
ii
of appellate judges and appellate opinions, and the overall place of federal district
courts in the judicial hierarchy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over forty years after Richardson and Vines (1967) complained that federal courts
“have seldom been investigated as a system of interactions,” the same problem con-
tinues to plague judicial scholarship, particularly concerning federal district courts.
This deficit is not trivial. District courts are the only face of justice for many federal
litigants. And yet, our knowledge of the business of these important courts is quite
limited.
Viewed as the sum of its chapters, this dissertation project seeks to remedy this
deficit. By collecting and coding thousands of case dockets, opinions, and other
court documents across multiple years, district courts, and issue areas, this project
provides unprecedented insights into the development of law, the strategies of parties,
the managerial role of judges, the influence of appellate judges and appellate opinions,
and the overall place of federal district courts in the judicial hierarchy.
Chapter 2, Integrating Process, Policy, and Outcomes in Judicial Studies, exam-
ines why certain district court cases end via compromise (settlement) while others
end in a more disputed fashion (trial or non-trial adjudication). The chapter also
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examines who ultimately wins in district court adjudications. The empirical find-
ings from the chapter reveal that litigant and judge-specic factors present in district
court cases affect both their method of termination and who ultimately prevails in a
dispute.
Chapter 3, The Impact of Courts of Appeals on Substantive and Procedural Suc-
cess in the Federal District Courts, examines the impact that courts of appeals have
on district court decision making after a case is appealed to the circuit court and then
returned to the district court on remand. Specifically, this essay examines what fea-
tures lead to a change in a case’s winning party and method of termination after the
case has been appealed and remanded back to the district court. In particular, the
specicity of appellate court directions given to district courts are an important deter-
minant of impact, as is the appellate court decision to publish the opinion remanding
the case to the district court.
Finally, in Chapter 4, Quantifying Appeals, I examine why litigants decide to
appeal from federal district courts. While every district court case arguably has a
loser, only some litigants choose to seek higher review after their loss. The results
reveal that strategy and procedural fairness are both important considerations in the
decision of a litigant to appeal.
2
Chapter 2
Integrating Process, Policy, and
Outcomes in Judicial Studies
The settlement of cases produces “greater disputant satisfaction with the decision
or with the courts generally” and permits “compromise positions that are unattainable
through adjudication” (Galanter, 1985). By choosing to settle a case, litigants are
able to control their case’s outcome, rather than risking the result that may happen
if the case’s outcome is left solely in the hands of the political institution that is
the judiciary — from the trial courts to the appellate courts. While settlements are
common in our court system, perhaps increasingly so (e.g. Galanter, 2004), they are
by no means the only way that cases terminate in our trial courts. Indeed, many cases
continue to end through very adversarial proceedings, such as trials or the granting
of motions for summary judgment. With such clear benefits for all parties involved,
why do only some cases settle while others continue on to contentious terminations
via trials and non-trial judge-based decision making? And, what does this all mean
for who ultimately wins in trial courts?
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Such a pre-merits and process based focus is common in other studies of political
institutions. At the Supreme Court, for example, recent work examines the agenda
setting decision making and pre-merits bargaining that takes place on the Court
(Maltzman, Spriggs and Wahlbeck, 2000). Looking beyond the judiciary, studies of
congressional committee decision makers (e.g. Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Deering
and Smith, 1997) have proven to be key in adding to our overall understanding of the
business of that institution.
Despite a recognition of the merits of studying early and varied decision making in
our other political institutions, such studies are only in their infancy in the context of
much of the judiciary. For example, the result of the existing work on federal district
courts, the trial courts of the federal system that serve as courts of first instance and
set the judicial agenda for much of the federal system, is that much of the process and
decision making that takes place remains unstudied. While we have some empirical
work on the published decision making of district judges and we have some formal
accounts of the strategic actions of litigants in these courts, a huge gap exists in the
research in this area that tends to ignore the intersection of these two groups of actors
and how they both act and make choices that have an influence on the process and
outcomes of district court cases.
The preferences and actions of these two sets of actors are likely to have important
implications for many parts of district court case activity. Chief among them are
the two areas of focus here: the method by which district court cases terminate
and who ultimately wins district court cases. Because of the actions, choices, and
preferences of judges and the litigants, some cases in federal district courts are resolved
through a settlement while others continue on to a court determined outcome —
whether that be through a contentious, granted motion or a trial. Each type of case
termination carries with it different risks and potential payoffs to the actors involved.
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The type of termination method is important to the parties involved but, perhaps
more importantly, has even greater implications for legal development, the threat of
reversal on appeal, and the like. When it comes to the direct parties involved in
litigation, nothing is likely to be more important than who the ultimate winner in the
case is. This second inquiry is also directly related to a wide variety of the previous
district court work that has been done, allowing this study’s broader research design
to illuminate and compare the findings.
In what follows, this article presents theories for why both sets of these actors and
the decisions that they make may influence cases in these ways. Using newly collected
data spanning 25 district courts and seven years, the empirical findings reveal that
both litigant and judge-specific factors present in district court cases affect both their
method of termination and who ultimately prevails in a dispute. The presence and
size of these results have important implications for the study of judicial processes
and political institutions more generally.
2.1 Theory
Often referred to as the workhorses of the federal judiciary, district courts are
the courts of first instance in the federal system and, in recent years, terminate over
300,000 cases per year (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2007). And, for
most cases, district courts are not just the first court they encounter, but are also the
last. While advancing a case to a higher court after a district court termination is
often possible, appeals are rare, and reversals of lower court decisions are even rarer
(see Eisenberg, 2004). As one district court judge put it,“[j]ustice stops in the district.
They either get it here or they can’t get it at all” (Carp and Wheeler, 1972, quoting
anonymous judge)
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Political scientists studying district courts have found that politics sometimes
plays a role in decision making in those courts. The research reveals, for example, that
district court judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to support
“underdog” claimants in standing disputes (Rowland and Todd, 1991) and defendants
in criminal cases (Rowland, Carp and Stidham, 1984). Other empirical district court
work finds that district court judges strategically anticipate the preferences of their
courts of appeals superiors Randazzo (2008). While this previous research certainly
advances our knowledge of much of the business of district courts, it also fails, at least
empirically, to capture the institutional interactions and decision making that take
place in these trial courts. In particular, district court litigation is dominated by the
development of a case record and proceedings, all of which, at least in theory, leads
toward a trial date. During this development stage, and continuing through case
termination, the parties and the judge are in constant interaction with one another.
This continuing, potentially years-long interaction between the parties and the
judge in a case stands in sharp contrast to proceedings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
or the U.S. Supreme Court, the appellate courts in the federal systems and the judicial
institutions that have received the bulk of attention from political scientists. The very
different process in the district courts, compared to the appellate courts, means that
applying the empirical models that are so often used in these higher courts to our
work on the lower courts is an imperfect solution. Instead, studying district courts
calls for theoretical and empirical consideration of the multiple important players
and the litigation process. This also means studying the different ways that cases
terminate in district courts, including by settlement, and, after accounting for those
multiple outcome methods, which parties win. As Mather points out, such an account
is appropriate and relevant for our field. She astutely notes that “political scientists
can observe a wide range of policy-making activities in federal and state trial courts:
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the judge is not the only political actor in court, and formal decisions at the end of
trial are not the only vehicle for making policy (Mather, 1995, 200).
2.1.1 Judges in District Courts
Beginning first with the role of judges in district court litigation, very little em-
pirical evidence exists about their behavior beyond how they vote in published cases.
This deficit is troubling since, unlike in appellate courts, judges in district courts have
the potential to be actively involved in the entire case’s proceedings and with its liti-
gants and attorneys. Since judges make many decisions and take many actions before
cases yield an authored judicial opinion or a final victorious party, examining the role
of the judge in these early stages of a case may provide us with useful information on
the total package of judging. We can begin to fill this important gap by examining
judicial behavior while judges are managing cases in district courts.
What, then, does the judge’s role look like in the different stages of district court
cases that proceed the cases’ terminations? Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the district court judges serving on cases are to provide a “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding” (Rule 1). Within the
broad auspices of this rule, district court judges have many opportunities to engage
in diverse activities — including presiding over trials, conferring and advising the
parties in the stages before a trial takes place, ruling on motions, monitoring the
implementation of agreed injunctive decrees, and approving plea bargains (see e.g.
Cannon and O’Brien, 1985, 29). The result of this varied job description is that the
district court judges have the potential to be a mediator, a fact-finder, a law-applier,
and a law-creator with enormous discretion in how a case develops and is resolved,
meaning that they “to a greater degree than appellate judges, experience the drama
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of the adversary process” (Cannon and O’Brien, 1985, 29). This role allows the dis-
trict court judge to have a frequently unrecognized ability to formulate and shape
wide-reaching judicial agendas and policy in a way that is often only credited to ap-
pellate judges (Mather, 1995). To further bolster the importance of the district court
judge’s role, his actions and conclusions are on the whole given a tremendous level of
deference by reviewing courts.
Given the design of federal district courts, it is very likely that judges, as case
managers (Resnik, 1982), are actively involved in controlling the disposition of cases,
regardless of the method by which those cases terminate. When ruling on potentially
case-ending motions (such as motions for summary judgment) or presiding of a bench
trial, judges serve in their most publicly salient post. And, even with jury trials,
district judges have a great deal of responsibility. As Judge Charles Wyzanski notes,
judges must assure that “the jurors, the parties, the witnesses, the counsel, and the
spectators not only follow the red threads of fact and of law but [also] leave the
courtroom persuaded of the fairness of the procedures and the high responsibility
of courts of justice in advancing the values we cherish most deeply” (Cannon and
O’Brien, 1985, 28-29).
And while not as facially obvious, many believe that judges, as case managers,
can also have an active part in leading cases to terminate by settlement. Galanter
(1985), for example, argues that settlement negotiations are often “encouraged, bro-
kered or actively mediated by the judge.” Within a case’s proceedings, judges can
“meet with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise
case preparation” (Resnik, 1982). And, indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
16 now lists “facilitating settlement” as one of the express purposes of a case’s pretrial
conference. Given this potential role, district court judges can actively communicate
with the parties as to the status of the case, particularly in cases that are not disposed
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of almost immediately upon being filed. If a judge so chooses, he can actively en-
courage settlement — and he has many opportunities to do so. And, as Molot (2003,
93) argues, pressure from a judge to settle a case can be quite persuasive to litigants:
“[a]lthough a litigant certainly is free to refuse to settle on terms he or she knows to
be unfair, a litigant asked by a judge to settle a case has strong incentives to agree
to a settlement and thereby avoid trying the case — or proceeding with discovery —
before a potentially hostile judge.”
Not all judges, and their differing case management techniques, should affect cases,
both in terms of how they terminate and who wins them, in the same way. Rather,
judges with certain background characteristics, preferences, and institutional roles
should be, for example, more likely push their cases toward settlement or more likely
to favor pro-defendant outcomes. Similarly, judges can use tools at their disposal,
such as mandating mediation or settlement conferences, if the want to more actively
encourage party settlement. In section 2.2 below, I discuss these specific features and
actions and the effect on the two questions of interest here that each should have.
2.1.2 The Importance of the Litigant
Litigants, and the choices that they make, also have a potentially huge impact on
the way that their cases proceed. Indeed, the litigant’s position is far more salient,
discretionary, and hands-on in district courts than it is in any of the appellate courts.
Litigants in trial courts create their strategy and tailor their actions based on a
consideration of “both how the opposing party will react to a possible move and how
the court might rule at trial” (Gross and Syverud, 1991, 328).
Because of their role and their presumably strategic consideration of how to pro-
ceed in a case, litigants seemingly have a huge impact in determining how their cases
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are resolved, both in terms of the method of the resolution and the winner. These
actors file the cases, control the discovery of evidence, and motion for rulings on
procedural and outcome based activities in the case. And, while a judge may take
actions to strongly encourage settlement, the litigants themselves are also ultimately
responsible for choosing whether a case will settle or will continue on toward trial.
While parties involved in litigation want to achieve their best possible outcome
— injunctive and/or monetary relief for plaintiffs and and a finding of no liability
for defendants — and do so for the smallest amount of expense possible, achieving
this outcome can be a long and risk-filled process. Based on the relevant standards
that will be applied and the development of the case along the way, litigants may be
able to inform themselves, at least to some degree, about their likelihood at success
in having certain pre-trial motions granted or gaining a favorable outcome if the
case advances to trial. However, given that strategic litigants will be accounting
for a number of relatively uncertain factors, such as the preferences and ideology
of the assigned judge and the strength, resources, and motivation of the opposing
party, much uncertainty is likely to exist for litigating parties. And, since “even a
perfect prediction leaves crucial questions unanswered” (Gross and Syverud, 1991,
327), lawyers must “anticipate the adjudicatory alternative” (Kritzer, 1986, 165).
As Haire, Lindquist and Hartley (1999) cogently point out: “In making strategic
calculations about whether to proceed with trial . . . more expert counsel will seek
settlement rather than risk trial when the probability of success at trial is low due to
the legal standard or to the contextual variables such as the predilections of judge or
jury...those counsel with less expertise may instead choose to litigate even when the
probability of success is low, since their ability to assess or predict success is less well
developed and thus less accurate.”
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Litigants, and the decisions that they make in district courts, have not gone
completely unstudied by scholars. Indeed, law and economics scholars have frequently
formally modeled litigant behavior in trial courts and how that behavior determines
whether cases will settle or continue toward trial (e.g. Priest and Klein, 1984; Spier,
1992; Waldfogel, 1998; Bebchuk, 1984). Bebchuk (1984) presents an asymmetric
information screening model where the uninformed player makes an initial demand
that the informed player can either accept (settlement occurs) or reject (the players
go to trial). The model predicts that cases with high levels of damages will go to trial,
as will cases with a large range of expected stakes and cases with low court costs.
And, in one of the most influential law and economics pieces ever written, Priest and
Klein (1984) model the selection of cases for trial.
Formal models of settlement practice coming after the early, seminal pieces have
focused on better representing the entire process, including the intricacies involved
in the stages and timing. For example, Spier (1992) models pretrial negotiation and
finds that a “deadline effect” emerges as a case’s trial date approaches. Watanabe
(2004)’s article likely provides the most litigation stage-inclusiveness of any piece in
existence. His model has the special ability to allow the rates of information to vary
for each of the repeated phases. As Watanabe notes, this feature can account for the
“discovery process” and the different legal devices used by the plaintiff and defendant
at different times throughout the process. In the litigation phase of his model, players
in equilibrium “choose to settle if the joint surplus of settling today is larger than the
joint surplus of continuing the case” (Watanabe, 2004).
This extensive formal modeling of litigant case resolution activity provides an
excellent theoretical background for the incorporation of litigant preferences, choices,
and actions into an empirical model of district court decision making. Among other
things, systematically collecting and modeling data on litigant actions, such as the
11
different types of motions, may help provide evidence on the calculations of these
litigants and how these calculations change as additional information is revealed.
Just as with judges, litigant activity and characteristics should have an effect on the
proceedings in district courts, particularly when it comes to the method by which the
case terminates and who wins. In section 2.2 below, I discuss these features and their
expected effects in greater detail.
2.2 Hypotheses
2.2.1 Judge Preferences, Experiences, and Characteristics
As noted above, a number of the previous district court studies have found that
the judges in these courts often behave in ways that are consistent with their political
preferences (e.g. Rowland and Todd, 1991). As Lyles (1995a, 2) notes, such findings
are comparable with the job description of district court judges: “[T]he frequency and
salience of district court policymaking, their gatekeeping role in the federal judiciary,
the characteristics and attitudes of the individual judges appointed to these courts,
as well as the dynamics of the appointment process itself, suggest a political nature
and function that should be rigorously analyzed.” District judges themselves also
believe that their preferences enter into their decision making. When asked whether
their “personal attitudes and values affect their discretionary judgments,” 58 percent
of the district judges responded “often” or “sometimes”; when asked the same ques-
tion about other district judges’ judgements, that number skyrocketed to 75 percent
(Lyles, 1995a, 25).
Since district judges’ discretionary judgment opportunities are present through-
out the litigation process and are not likely to be limited to published, opinion-based
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outcomes, so too should the occasions for these judge’s preferences to enter their deci-
sion making. In particular, this means that it is likely that district judges preferences
may influence case termination methods and case winners. According to Baum (e.g.
2005, 85), conservative judges are likely to be predisposed to favor defendants, espe-
cially those serving as business or governmental interests. Certain case areas, such as
personal injury torts, nearly always involve individual plaintiffs suing these organized
defendants. In these cases, where potential jury awards could be very damaging to
the business interests, conservative judges may be more likely to encourage the parties
to settle their lawsuit prior to trial.
Given the theories on female decision making (see also Sherry, 1986; George, 2001;
Resnik, 1988; Karst, 1984; Gilligan, 1982), female district court judges, based upon
their social and background experiences and their communication and problem solving
skills, should be more apt to dispose of the cases before them by settlement than will
male judges. The most tangible representation of this is by comparing the use of
the heavily adversarial and rule-based nature of trials and non-trial adjudications to
the non-adversarial and compromise-driven nature of settlements by male and female
judges.1 Previous work studying civil rights and personal injury cases across four
federal district courts found that female judges are marginally but consistently more
likely to settle their cases than male judges (Boyd, 2006). Additionally, female district
judges have been found to be more willing to protect the interests of the weak, which
is often the plaintiff. For example, when given the statement that “Poor litigants are
treated fairly in the courts,” 80 percent of female judges agreed while only 60 percent
1While acknowledging that such an inquiry into the judging of male and females
on the district courts is not causal in nature (Boyd, Epstein and Martin, 2007), as
a descriptive matter it should nonetheless provide insight into judging and decision
making more generally.
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of the male judges did (Lyles, 1995a). Thus, female judges should be more likely than
their male colleagues to support the plaintiff’s claims over defendants in civil cases.
Just like the ideology and gender of the assigned judge might affect decisionmaking
in district courts, so too might the judge’s time on the court and his institutional roles.
As has been theorized, “life tenure permits federal judges to become entrenched in
their ways and resistant to new ideas” (Sisk, Heise and Morriss, 1998, 1486). Applied
here, the more time that a judge has spent on the bench, the more he may prefer
to utilize trials over settlement. Judges with a lot of judicial seniority may be more
accustomed to trials being a more common feature of district court decision making
and judging and will be less accustomed to working within a system that contains
such features that actively encourage case settlement such as mediation. Similarly,
the longer the tenure of the judge, the more likely he will be to make decisions that
benefit the plaintiff, since concerns over a perceived rising litigiousness are a relatively
new phenomenon.
Judges with senior status, or, in other words, those judges that have retired and
now serve a part-time, as-desired role, are not likely to feel the same pressures as
active district court judges. Judges with senior status do not serve on a districts’
random assignment wheel and are more likely to be able to choose their cases or at
least the characteristics of the cases that they work on. Additionally, unlike active
judges, senior judges do not need to worry about developing a speedy work record
that makes them attractive for elevation to a higher court, and thus, will not feel
as constrained to resolve as many of their cases in as short of time as possible (see,
e.g., Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006). This means that senior status judges
should be less likely to terminate their cases by settlement and more likely to have
them end with a plaintiff victory than active judges.
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Chief judges, on the other hand, are responsible for the administrative success of
their district. As a result, the chief judges are likely to feel more constrained by fast
case termination and low case load than their colleagues on the bench. This means
that chiefs should be more likely to have their cases terminate through settlement and
should be more likely to have cases ending in defendant victories (since this sends a
message to future plaintiffs that litigiousness is not a successful strategy) (see, e.g.,
Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006).
Under the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968, magistrate judges serving in federal
district courts may determine pretrial matters, conduct hearings, try misdemeanors,
and, upon the consent of the parties, conduct civil jury and bench proceedings. These
judges are not appointed under Article III of the Constitution but rather serve a
district for eight years (full-time) or four years (part-time) after being selected by the
district court judges. Their purpose is “to cull from the ever-growing workload of
the U.S. district courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of
judicial officers” (Legislative History 1968 U.S.Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4255).
Magistrate judges, serving as the presiding judge in civil cases by the consent
of the parties, are likely to desire appointment to the district courts. And, indeed,
many current district court judges were once magistrates. These judges are likely to
be particularly concerned about avoiding drawing negative attention to themselves.
Similarly, because of their training in handling pre-trial matters such as discovery and
presiding over things like settlement conferences, these judges are also likely to help
cases resolve through settlement. They should also be more likely than regular judges
to have their cases go to trial, something that is likely the case because the parties
have explicitly consented to “trial before a magistrate.” On the flip side, presiding
magistrates should be less likely to dispose of cases through non-trial adjudications,
15
largely because these inexperienced judges will not want to make such a contentious
ruling where deference is supposed to be given to the non-moving party.
While magistrates are sometimes the primary presiding judge in a district court
case, more often, these judges act as the second judge in the case, where they serve
alongside the assigned Article III judge. For cases with a magistrate on the record
to assist the assigned judge, dispositions by settlements should be more likely since
the presence of the additional magistrate should lead to more hands-on proceedings.
However, based on the gendered theories of decision making discussed above, these
effects should be mitigated by the sex of the magistrate, meaning that female mag-
istrates assisting in a case should make that case more likely to settle than a male
judge assisting. This expectation is consistent with the findings of Carroll (2003),
who found that male and female magistrates vote differently from one another.
2.2.2 Judge Actions
As noted above, district court judges can take an active part in encouraging parties
to settle. To this end, district judges can mandate that parties attempt to settle their
cases during the course of litigation. Two common and institutionalized methods of
doing so include referring the case to a type of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR),
such as mediation, or requiring the parties to participate in a settlement conference.2
When ADR is required, the parties are required to appoint a neutral arbitrator that
will facilitate discussions between them. Generally these facilitators have no decision
making authority and frequently are not even required to hold a law degree (see
e.g. Ravindra, 2005, 295). For settlement conferences, a similar sort of discussion
2Apparently in most district courts, when the judge requires litigants to participate
in an activity such as one of these, “the referral is only presumptively mandatory”
(Plapinger and Stienstra, 1996, 7).
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takes place, only this time in front of a court official like another district judge or a
magistrate. In either case, upon completion of the formalized negotiation discussion,
the facilitator will report to the district judge at the end of the effort on whether or
not a settlement was achieved (Ravindra, 2005). If no settlement is reached, the case
will continue.
The occurrence of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or settlement conferences
forces parties to formally come together and discuss the possibilities of settling their
case. Generally with the help of a neutral evaluator, parties are able to better under-
stand their chances of success and the expectations of their opponent. Since bringing
up the possibility of settlement on their own can be perceived as a sign of case weak-
ness, lawyers tend to delay talk of settlement as long as possible (Provine, 1986, 10).
Because of this, the judge’s role in facilitating settlement discussions can not only
breathe realism into the case but also alleviate the pressure from the attorneys to
force the issue themselves. As Ravindra (2005, 304) put it,
The settlement conference may be the first time both sides to the dis-
pute are presented, and attorneys may benefit from a judge’s take on the
contrasting presentation. In addition, lawyers want to engage in a pro-
cess that creates movement. They want the judge to be an influence on
the process, not merely a message carrier. The attorneys already know
their case and the other side’s case. What they often need is another
perspective to add to this dynamic.
As such, the presence of court-mandated settlement conferences or ADR in a case
should increase the likelihood of case settlement and decrease the chances of trial and
non-trial adjudication.
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2.2.3 Litigant Action
When a party motions the court for some sort of pre-trial termination of the case,
the likelihood of the case settling is lessened since some of the motions should be
successful. The two most common types of pre-trial termination motions are motions
for summary judgment and motions to dismiss. Motions for summary judgment are
based on the standard present in F.R.C.P. Rule 56 which reads that the motion should
be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” As Molot (2003, 45) notes, “no
one questions that summary judgment is an important part of contemporary pretrial
practice.” Motions to dismiss come for a variety of reasons, but are commonly based
on F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
or F.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(1) or (2) for lack of jurisdiction. Motions to dismiss present
the motioning party with an extremely difficult barrier to overcome — nearly all cases
are able to state a claim or state a ground for federal jurisdiction — and thus, these
motions will rarely be successful and may provide only limited information on whether
a case will or will not settle. Alternatively, summary judgment motions are granted
far more frequently since the standard effectively says that this kind of relief will be
granted if the defendant “most certainly will win at trial.” Thus, the presence of
either motion should make a non-trial adjudication more likely, although a summary
judgment motion should have a larger effect than a motion to dismiss.
On the other hand, the request for a jury trial by either party in the district court
case serves as a signal that one or both of the parties are expressing that they do
not want the district judge to be the final and sole decision maker in the case.3 This
3While a judge still decides issues of law during jury trials, the jury is responsible
for all fact-finding.
18
is consistent with Hersh’s (2006) empirical findings that cases with a jury demand
are more likely to settle than cases without. As such, the presence of a jury demand
should lead to more case settlements and fewer trials and non-trial adjudications.
2.2.4 Litigant Status
Beginning with Galanter (1974), a large body of research has studied litigant
status and how differences in litigant resources impact the success of one party over
another. As is frequently the case in these suits, an individual litigant sues a corporate
or government party – a lineup that means that a generally meager-resourced litigant
is suing a relative deep-pocketed and experienced one. These asymmetries in power,
resources, and experience often mean that there will also be asymmetries in outcomes,
with strong parties more often than not coming out on top. While most of the research
in this area has studied the impact of resources differences on success at the merits
– i.e. who wins – the theory underlying this body of research should also directly
apply to the decisions about the continuation of the case made by litigants prior to
the termination of their case in district courts.
As such, cases with weak plaintiffs relative to the defendants should be less likely
to settle or go to trial and more likely to end in non-trial adjudication. As the parties
approach equal status levels, and consistent with Priest and Klein (1984), they should
have their highest likelihood of going to trial. As the plaintiff’s strength grows relative
to the defendants, settlement should be increasingly likely. A similar structure should
be expected when it comes to victories. Defendants should be most likely to win when
they are strong and facing a weak plaintiff. Settlement and plaintiff victories should
be more likely as the plaintiff strengthens. Within this study, litigant resources are
assessed in a similar fashion to that used in the long line of previous work on this
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subject (see e.g., Black and Boyd, 2007; Brace and Hall, 2001; Collins, 2004; Farole,
1999; Rowland and Todd, 1991; Sheehan, 1992; Sheehan, Mishler and Songer, 1992;
Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 1999; Wheeler et al., 1987).
2.2.5 Hierarchical Constraints
While a district court case is proceeding, the judge and the parties have no idea
whether the case will ultimately end up before the appellate courts. Nonetheless, the
looming presence of potential review in these courts may alter the decision making of
both litigants and judges in district courts. This is particularly the case in federal dis-
trict courts where the right to appeal to the courts of appeals is generally guaranteed
and is exercised in a non-trivial number of cases (see Eisenberg, 2004).4 These factors
mean that appellate courts are an ever-present influence in case dispositions. Dis-
trict court judges are likely to account for the preferences of the higher court judges
when making their decisions (Randazzo, 2008), and the litigants are likely to weigh
their chances of success before these higher courts when deciding how to proceed in
the lower court (and whether perhaps to actively pursue settlement, which effectively
removes the appellate court from the scenario) (see e.g., Priest and Klein, 1984). As
Eisenberg and Heise (2009) note, we should expect that baseline circuit judges will be
likely to favor the original defendant in the case over plaintiff, something the authors
argue is a product of either a real or perceived pro-plaintiff bias in trial courts. As the
supervising circuit court grows increasingly conservative, its likelihood of support for
4The appeal rate in federal civil cases is around 11 percent. Approximately half
of these appeals are never heard on the merits by the appellate court. (I.e., only 5.6
percent of district court cases are appealed and decided on the merits by the courts of
appeals). When Eisenberg limits his analysis to only those cases with a clear victory
for the defendant or plaintiff in the lower court, appeal rates rise to 21 percent (all
appeals) and 11.4 percent (appeals that then go to merits conclusion).
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the defendant should also grow, something that district court actors are likely to take
into account. As such, as the circuit court gets more conservative, defendant victo-
ries should be more likely in the district court and settlements and plaintiff victories
should be less likely.
2.3 Data
To capture the method and winner of cases terminated in federal district courts,
I turn to a newly collected dataset of cases terminated in 25 federal district courts.
These cases are an ideal arena for examining district court litigation in the broadest
of terms since they terminate in a variety of different ways, at different stages, and
often lead to outcomes that do not result in a judge-authored opinion.
This project seeks to improve on the data collection shortcomings of previous
projects studying some aspect of district court decision making, thus enabling the
findings of this research project to be both generalizable and wide-reaching. To do
this, I collect data on cases terminated from 2000 to 2006 in 25 of the 94 federal district
courts. All of the twelve traditional, geographically-based circuit courts except the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are represented.5 Table 2.1
displays more details on the 25 districts included in the study.
5The districts included in the study were selected simply because they provide
circuit and geographic diversity and because the chief judges agreed to provide me
PACER (described below) fee exemptions for studying the case materials from their
courts. Note that of the district courts to be studied here, the chief judges (who
granted me free PACER access) have varied ideological backgrounds.
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1st Circuit 2nd Circuit 3rd Circuit 4th Circuit 5th Circuit 6th Circuit
DRI SDNY MDPA DMD NDTX NDOH
EDNY DDE EDVA EDLA EDMI
WDTN
7th Circuit 8th Circuit 9th Circuit 10th Circuit 11th Circuit
NDIL EDMO WDWA DCO MDFL
NDIN NDIA CDCA DKS NDFL
DSD NDOK NDGA
Table 2.1: The 25 federal district courts, arranged by their circuit, included
in the study.
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To identify the population of all cases that terminate in these district courts
during the years of my study, I turn to the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) Integrated
Databases, which includes standardized filing and termination information reported
from district court clerks of court for every case terminated in the district courts for
the years in my study. To narrow the data down to the cases of interest, I rely on the
filing party’s chosen coding of the case’s nature of suit (NOS). In particular, I focus
here on cases involving business, civil rights, and personal injury torts issues.6 For
purposes of this study, I draw a stratified random sample of 250 cases per district.
With these cases in hand, I gathered and coded from PACER (“Public Access to
Court Electronic Records”) the case docket and other relevant case documents for
each case in the sample.
The traditional district court studies mentioned above generally only study dis-
trict court outcomes that are published in the Federal Supplement. For a district
court judge, the decision to publish an opinion is wholly discretionary, and the re-
sulting published cases appear to be in no way a random sample of all district court
decisions (Songer, 1988; Siegelman and Donohue III, 1990; Swenson, 2004; Ringquist
and Emmert, 1999). Unlike that previous research, the research design in the present
study allows for the investigation of cases that resolve through a variety of methods
and that often times yield no judge-authored opinion, including those ending in trials
and settlements. In addition, for the small handful of studies that provide a detailed
investigation of district court process or unpublished decisions, the analysis tends to
be of a small number of districts (e.g. Waldfogel, 1998, Southern District of New
6The exact NOS codes are: civil rights cases (440, 442, 443, 444), personal injury
cases (310, 320, 340, 350, 360), and business-related cases (190, 820, 830, 840). The
NOS code is a issue area classification for a case. It is assigned to the case based on
the identification by the plaintiff’s attorney filing the case when he fills out his Civil
Cover Sheet.
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York; Smith, 2006, District of D.C.; Rowland and Carp, 1996, Kansas City, MO and
Detroit, MI; but see Kim et al., 2009, Boyd and Hoffman, 2010), something that this
study is also able to vastly improve on.7
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Termination Method
Turning first to an examination of what explains whether a case terminates by
settlement, trial, or non-trial adjudication in district courts, I estimate a multinomial
logistic regression model with robust standard errors clustered on the assigned judge.
Details on the covariates and their measurement are included in Table 2.5 in the
appendix. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the results of this estimation.
7In the past, before electronic case dockets were available, researchers had to make
copies of individual dockets in each district’s courthouse. With today’s nearly uni-
versal reliance on PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records”) by district
courts, such geographic limitations are no longer in place. It is worth noting, however,
that electronic dockets and case materials are only available from the mid-1990s for-
ward, meaning that for more longitudinal studies of district courts, previously-used
techniques are the only possibility.
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Non-Trial Adjudication Trial
vs. vs.
Settled Settled
District Judge Ideology -0.085 0.148
(0.16) (0.29)
Circuit Court Ideology 0.203 -0.006
(0.24) (0.36)
Litigant Status Difference -0.236* -0.133*
(0.03) (0.06)
District Judge Years on Bench 0.001 0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
Motion to Dismiss 0.733* 0.760*
(0.11) (0.16)
Motion for Summary Judgment 1.979* 1.612*
(0.11) (0.18)
Alternative Dispute Resolution -1.296* 0.090
(0.17) (0.18)
Settlement Conference -1.461* 0.105
(0.15) (0.18)
Jury Demand -0.842* -0.515*
(0.11) (0.18)
Female District Judge 0.001 -0.223
(0.13) (0.22)
Senior District Judge -0.305 0.130
(0.21) (0.32)
Chief District Judge 0.235 -0.057
(0.28) (0.24)
Female Magistrate Assistance -0.303 -0.752
(0.22) (0.43)
Male Magistrate Assistance -0.134 -0.105
(0.14) (0.22)
Magistrate Assigned Case -0.619* 0.843*
(0.23) (0.26)
Civil Rights Case 0.781* -0.164
(0.16) (0.23)
Business Case 0.121 -0.332
(0.20) (0.27)
Constant -2.010* -3.213*
(0.21) (0.36)
Log Likelihood -2890.995
Pseudo R2 0.208
Observations 4956
Table 2.2: Multinomial regression results for the termination method of cases
in federal district courts. Cases terminated by settlement are the baseline.
Statistical significance is represented with * (p<0.05, two-tailed). Tort Cases
are the baseline issue area and are excluded from the model.
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Non-Trial Adjudication Trial
vs. vs.
Settled Settled
District Judge Ideology -0.140 0.169
(0.17) (0.28)
Circuit Court Ideology 0.265 0.062
(0.22) (0.35)
Litigant Status Difference -0.211* -0.140*
(0.04) (0.06)
District Judge Years on Bench -0.000 0.002
(0.01) (0.01)
Motion to Dismiss 0.927* 0.808*
(0.12) (0.16)
Motion for Summary Judgment 2.349* 1.646*
(0.11) (0.18)
Alternative Dispute Resolution -1.167* 0.042
(0.18) (0.19)
Settlement Conference -1.389* 0.214
(0.15) (0.19)
Jury Demand -0.685* -0.479*
(0.13) (0.20)
Female District Judge -0.138 -0.184
(0.13) (0.22)
Senior District Judge -0.330 0.071
(0.21) (0.33)
Chief District Judge -0.212 -0.099
(0.23) (0.26)
Female Magistrate Assistance -0.196 -0.669
(0.24) (0.44)
Male Magistrate Assistance 0.031 -0.132
(0.14) (0.21)
Magistrate Assigned Case -0.525* 0.803*
(0.24) (0.26)
Civil Rights Case 0.647* -0.207
(0.17) (0.24)
Business Case 0.165 -0.224
(0.22) (0.27)
Constant -2.451* -3.384*
(0.23) (0.39)
Log Likelihood -2474.372
Pseudo R2 0.231
Observations 4547
Table 2.3: Multinomial regression results for the termination method of cases
terminating greater than 60 days from filing in federal district courts. Cases
terminated by settlement are the baseline. Statistical significance is repre-
sented with * (p<0.05, two-tailed). Tort Cases are the baseline issue area
and are excluded from the model.
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The estimation reported in Table 2.3 mirrors that reported in 2.2 with one excep-
tion: the later model estimates the results only for those cases terminating more than
60 days from filing. Re-estimating the results solely for terminations in the post-60
days from filing period helps ensure that the results are not being driven by parties
strategically dismissing their cases (for later re-filing) after discovering the identity
of the case’s assigned judge. Of note, the results from the two models are virtually
identical, thus alleviating any concerns that the results are being driven by litigants
strategically settling or dismissing their cases based solely on the identity of the as-
signed judge. Now returning to the main model, as expected, a number of variables
related to judge characteristics, judge activity, litigant strategy, and litigant status
reach statistical significance. To better understand the substantive effect of these
results, I turn to estimations of the predicted probabilities that these characteristics
will lead to a particular type of termination method in a case.
Focusing first on the judge-specific factors that have an effect on termination
method, three variables — judge mandated ADR and settlement conferences along
with the assignment and consent of the parties to have a magistrate to preside over
the case — have an influence. As is visible in Figure 2.1 and as expected, ADR and
settlement conferences each have a strong, positive (and nearly identical) effect on
increasing the chances of settlement of a case. Mandated ADR in a case increases
the likelihood of case settlement by 11 percent. Similarly, court-directed settlement
conferences lead to an 0.12 increase in the chance of case settlement. Each of these
negotiation scenarios acts to decrease the likelihood of a case terminating by a non-
trial adjudication but has no significant effect on a case ending via trial.
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Figure 2.1: The predicted probability that a case will terminate by settlement,
trial, or non-trial adjudication given the presence or lack of alternative dispute
resolution, settlement conferences, and magistrate assigned.
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Cases where the parties consent to a magistrate presiding over all of their proceed-
ings, compared to those with a traditional Article III district court judges, also have
their termination methods affected. In particular, as is shown in the right-hand panel
of Figure 2.1, assigned magistrates have their cases terminate more frequently by trial
than district court judges and less frequently by non-trial adjudications. Specifically,
a magistrate-case has a predicted probability of ending with a non-trial adjudica-
tion of 0.20 and a 0.08 probability of going to trial while a district judge-case has a
non-trial adjudication probability of 0.32 and a trial probability of 0.03.8
Turning now to litigant-specific characteristics and their effect on the termination
method of a case, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 indicate that four relevant variables are signif-
icant. The two types of motions by litigants to involuntarily dismiss the case early
both have strong effects in the expected direction. Motions for summary judgment
have a particularly strong impact on case termination method, with their presence
making non-trial adjudications 41 percent more likely and settlements 43 percent less
likely. In comparison, motions to dismiss have a more modest effect. Cases without
such a motion have a probability of terminating through a non-trial adjudication of
0.17 while cases with such a motion have an 0.30 probability of such a termination.
A similar difference is found for settlement, but the likelihood of trial is effectively
unaffected by the presence of a motion to dismiss. As expected and as graphed in
8Overlapping confidence intervals for predictions does not necessarily mean that no
statistically significant difference exists between two probabilities. Rather, the real
value of interest is the the difference in the probability, and it has a separate distri-
bution with its own mean and confidence interval (Austin and Hux, 2002; Epstein,
Martin and Schneider, 2006). The difference between settlement probabilities here is
0.08 and has a confidence interval of [-0.0020, 0.1641]. Because the confidence inter-
val on this difference contains 0, settled cases just miss statistical significance. The
difference between the non-trial adjudication probabilities is 0.1277 [0.0540, 0.2015],
and the difference between trial probabilities is 0.0467 [0.0014, 0.082], both of which
are significant differences.
29
the right-hand panel of Figure 2.2, the presence of a jury demand has the opposite
effect of summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss. Cases with a jury de-
mand are 16 percent more likely to settle and 15 less likely to terminate through a
non-trial adjudication; the likelihood of trial is, statistically speaking, unaffected by
the presence of a jury demand. This finding is consistent with the expectation that,
by requesting a trial by the jury, the parties are making clear that they want to avoid
a case termination with the judge as the final decision maker.
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Figure 2.2: The predicted probability that a case will terminate by settlement,
trial, or non-trial adjudication given the presence or lack of summary judgment
motions, motions to dismiss, and jury demands.
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The final litigant-specific factor of significance with regard to case termination
method is the status of the plaintiff and defendant in relation to each other. Figure
2.3 displays the predicted probability of a case terminating by a particular method
as the plaintiff’s status grows relative to the status of the defendant. The figure
reveals a number of very interesting things. First of all, relative litigant status has
no effect on the probability of a case going to trial, something that is obvious by
viewing the effectively horizontal medium gray band that hovers just above “0.” As
expected, the probability of a case settling is at its lowest when a weak plaintiff
faces a strong defendant. In those cases, the probability of a case settling compared
to terminating through a non-trial adjudication is, after accounting for confidence
intervals, effectively a draw. Interestingly, as the plaintiff’s status increases relative
to the defendant, the likelihood of settlement continues to rise, even after the plaintiff
has a much higher status than the defendant. Indeed, when a very strong plaintiff is
facing a weak defendant, the predicted probability of the case terminating through
settlement is nearly guaranteed. In reality, though, this result is driven by a handful
of cases with the federal government as the plaintiff and a consent judgment as the
final settled outcome.
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Figure 2.3: The predicted probability that a case will terminate by settlement,
trial, or non-trial adjudication given the changing difference in status between
the plaintiff and the defendant. Negative status advantages indicate that a
weak plaintiff is facing a stronger defendant while positive status advantages
indicate that a strong plaintiff is suing a weaker defendant.
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2.4.2 Winner
I turn next to a model of the ultimate winner of a district court case: the plaintiff,
the defendant, or both (through a settlement). Once again, the data are fit using a
multinomial logistic regression model with standard errors clustered on the appointed
judge. The results of this model are displayed in Table 2.4.
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Defendant Wins Plaintiff Wins
vs. vs.
Settled Settled
District Judge Ideology -0.047 0.213
(0.11) (0.23)
Circuit Court Ideology 0.433* -0.173
(0.15) (0.28)
Litigant Status Difference -0.225* 0.163*
(0.02) (0.05)
District Judge Years on Bench 0.003 -0.009
(0.01) (0.01)
Alternative Dispute Resolution -1.066* -0.394*
(0.13) (0.20)
Settlement Conference -1.014* -0.107
(0.11) (0.20)
Female District Judge -0.005 -0.019
(0.09) (0.19)
Senior District Judge -0.200 -0.075
(0.16) (0.30)
Chief District Judge 0.112 -0.619*
(0.18) (0.25)
Magistrate Assigned Case -0.236 0.319
(0.18) (0.33)
Civil Rights Case 0.763* -0.030
(0.12) (0.28)
Business Case 0.312* 1.280*
(0.15) (0.24)
Constant -1.284* -2.600*
(0.15) (0.26)
Log Likelihood -4297.479
Pseudo R2 0.107
Observations 5698
Table 2.4: Multinomial regression results for the winner of cases terminating
in federal district courts. Cases ending in a settled outcome are the baseline.
Statistical significance is represented with * (p<0.05, two-tailed). Tort Cases
are the baseline issue area and are excluded from the model.
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Of the district judge-specific variables, three reach standard levels of statistical
significance: chief judge, ADR, and settlement conference.9 Figure 2.4 depicts the
predicted probabilities for a particular winner in a case based on the presence of court-
mandated ADR or a settlement conference. As is clear in the figure, these required
negotiation sessions have very similar effects. Their presence moves civil rights cases
from having nearly equal likelihood of the defendant winning to the case settling
to an approximately 0.70 chance of the parties reaching a compromised outcome.
The likelihood of a pure plaintiff victory remains untouched by the presence or lack
of ADR or settlement conferences, indicating that judges’ decisions to require these
formalized negotiations are solely eating away at defendant victories and, as such, are
to the benefit of plaintiffs.
9While a judge being the chief district court judge reaches statistical significance, it
does not have a substantive effect on the probability that a case will have a particular
winner. Whether the case ends with a plaintiff or defendant victory or ends through a
settlement, the presence of a chief judge as the assigned judge makes anywhere from
a 0.01 to 0.03 difference. For defendant victories and settlements, the confidence
intervals around this slight difference also contain 0.
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Figure 2.4: The predicted probability that a case will have a particular winner
given the presence or lack of ADR and settlement conferences.
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The supervising circuit court’s ideology, which represents a potential constraint
on the decision making and strategy of both litigants and judges in district courts,
also has a significant effect on who wins in the district courts. Figure 2.5 depicts the
predicted probabilities based on circuit court ideology. As expected, as the supervising
circuit court gets more conservative, the more likely defendants are to win and the
less likely cases are to settle. And, as the circuit court gets more liberal, the opposite
is true. Settlements and defendant victories are equally likely when the circuit court
has a moderate ideology. Somewhat surprisingly, circuit ideology has no effect on the
likelihood of plaintiff victories.
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Figure 2.5: The predicted probability that a case will have a particular winner
based on the supervising circuit court’s median ideology.
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In addition, just as in the termination model, the difference between the status
of the defendants’ and plaintiffs’ resources and status have an effect on who wins a
district court case. As shown in Figure 2.6, as plaintiffs increase their status advantage
over the defendant, they see a modest increase in their pure victories over defendants.
When weak plaintiffs sue strong defendants, the defendants are highly advantaged,
with nearly 80 percent of civil rights cases with (poor individuals suing the federal
government) ending with a defendant victory. When defendants have just a slight
status advantage over plaintiffs, defendant victories are equally likely and, when as
defendants find themselves being sued by strong plaintiffs, settlement is increasingly
likely.
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Figure 2.6: The predicted probability that a case will have a plaintiff or defen-
dant winner or a settled outcome by the changing status differentials between
the parties. Negative status advantages indicate that a weak plaintiff is facing
a stronger defendant while positive status advantages indicate that a strong
plaintiff is suing a weaker defendant.
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2.5 Discussion
With a new dataset of district court case activity across 25 districts and seven
years, this study provides one of the first attempts to empirically capture the role of
judges and litigants in district court cases. In so doing, this research finds that the
actions, characteristics, and roles of both key actors can have an influence on how the
cases terminate and who wins them. These findings reiterate some things that we may
have already known about the case management stage of judicial decision making.
As we can see from all of the model’s estimates, cases are very likely to be disposed of
by settlement under almost all circumstances. Given the “vanishing trial” literature
that exists, this is neither a new nor a surprising finding. However, as discussed in
the introduction, the real question is why certain cases do not settle. As revealed in
the analysis here, the answer to this is one based both on the parties and their actions
and the judge and his actions. Such insight into district court activity would not be
possible with reliance on a traditional research design using only published opinions.
For those connoisseurs of judicial politics research across courts, the lack of sta-
tistically significant findings with regard to the district judge ideology variable and
the modest findings in only one model for the circuit ideology variable may come as
a surprise. At the same rate, however, because the complete litigation process and
the large caseload within district courts is so complex, it is quite possible that politi-
cal preferences and constraints are muted in most day-to-day decisions and activities
within federal trial courts.
While judge ideology is not a significant predictor of the dependent variables,
other judge-related features such as assigned magistrate judges and judge mandated
settlement conferences and ADR have strong effects. Including court required ADR
and settlement conferences in the models captures very explicit ways that the assigned
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judge in the case can encourage the parties to settle their case. It is quite likely that
judges, if they so choose, use far less explicit ways, like during pretrial conferences,
to encourage the same. Unlike ADR and settlement conferences, these alternative
methods for judges to encourage settlement cannot be systematically captured from
case materials. This means that in many ways, the test for judge-encouragement of
settlement provided here is a conservative one, and, as such it makes the large effect
on settlement found in both models all the more impressive.
The present work is not without its own caveats. Notably, it is limited in its
longitudinal scope. The cases covered here (those terminating from 2000-2006) come
from an era of homogeneity on the district courts. The reliance on electronic dockets
and other case materials means that a study such as this can only systematically
extend back ten or so years. Beyond that, dockets are not reliably available online.
Similar case materials from earlier years are available in court archives, but their large-
scale retrieval would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming. This means that
for studies of district courts extending further back in time, the data relied upon in
other district court studies (e.g., Rowland and Carp 1996), when properly caveated,
remain the best resource available.
The litigant status-difference results in both models are quite substantial and
telling. Galanter’s (1974) important work predicts a huge advantage for “haves” in
litigation, and that is exactly what we see here, both in terms of case termination
methods and case winners. While the litigant status effects are large, we might be
able to see even more differences among litigants based on their status if we could
systematically view all case settlement terms. In other words, while we are seeing a
lot of settlements here across the board, a plaintiff might be able to negotiate higher
levels of injunctive and monetary relief as he has a higher level of status, and as such,
more experienced attorneys and more resources at his disposal.
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In the broadest sense, the study of federal district courts (and the actors/decisions
within them) is a study of the future of litigation, including Supreme Court decision
making. As cases develop in district courts and as parties decide to settle some cases
while letting other continue on to a contested outcome through a trial or a non-trial
adjudication, the resulting trends in terms of termination methods and winners are
indicative of the future case composition in the federal appellate courts – the courts
of appeals and the Supreme Court — and also tells us about what issues are likely
to settle outside of the formal legal system in the future and what case areas will
continue to be subject to judicial intervention.
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2.6 Appendix
Variables Measurement
Judge Ideology Measured based on Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores us-
ing the methodology described in the Giles et al. (2001) and
Epstein et al. (2007) papers. These scores are the Poole
and Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space score (available at
http://voteview.com/readmeb.htm) of the senator from a judge’s
home state (or average of the two senators) if that senator(s) is
from the same party as the appointing president. If neither sena-
tor is from the same party as the president, the judge is assigned
the Common Space score of the appointing president. The result-
ing computed ideology scores range from -1 (the most liberal) to
1 (the most conservative). For magistrate judges presiding over
a case, I code the ideology of these actors by taking the median
district court judge JCS score for the year that they assumed their
position. For the courts of appeals score, I collected the individual
JCS scores (available from Epstein et al. 2007) for the judges in the
majority and then computed the median for each majority panel.
Litigant Status
Difference
Measured as the difference between plaintiff status and defendant
status. Measures for each party are as follows: (0) poor individual,
(1) individual, (2) interest group and unions, (3) business, (4) local
government, (5) big business, (6) state government, and (7) federal
government
District Judge Years
on Bench
Measured as the number of years that a district judge has been
serving in that position from confirmation to case termination
Motion to Dismiss The presence on the case’s docket of any involuntary motion to
dismiss the case in full
Motion for Summary
Judgment
The presence on the case’s docket of a motion for summary judg-
ment in full
Alternative Dispute
Resolution
The presence on the case’s docket of any court-required ADR. ADR
that appears based solely on the consent of the parties or is because
of contractual obligations is not recorded here.
Settlement
Conference
The presence on the case’s docket of a required settlement confer-
ence.
Jury Demand A request for a jury demand by either or both parties in the case,
as recorded in the case’s docket header.
Female District
Judge
The presence of a female assigned judge at the time of case termi-
nation
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Senior District
Judge
The presence of a senior district judge assigned at the time of case
termination
Chief District Judge The presence of a chief district judge at the time of case termination
Female Magistrate
Assistance
The presence of assistance by a female judge (in addition to the
assigned district judge) in a case, as recorded on the docket
Male Magistrate
Assistance
The presence of assistance by a male judge (in addition to the
assigned district judge) in a case, as recorded on the docket
Magistrate Assigned
Case
Per the consent of the parties, the assignment of a magistrate judge
as the assigned/presiding judge in a case
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Courts of Appeals
on Substantive and Procedural
Success in the Federal District
Courts
Long ago, Richardson and Vines (1967, 597) complained that federal courts “have
seldom been investigated as a system of interactions.” Today, this problem continues
to plague judicial scholarship, particularly concerning lower federal courts. To help
rectify this deficit, this article examines the influence that U.S. courts of appeals have
on the outcomes and procedural mechanisms of federal district courts. While previous
research has examined judicial impact within the federal hierarchy, little work has
studied this topic without focusing specifically on the United States Supreme Court
or on case outcomes.
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By turning the focus to the impact of the federal system’s intermediate appellate
courts on district courts, we can begin to understand the effectiveness of the federal
judicial hierarchy in a way that centers on the institutional setting where most federal
litigation takes place. Although scholars have long theorized about the impact that
higher courts have on district court decision making (e.g Gruhl, 1980; Richardson and
Vines, 1967; Baum, 1980), this article provides some of the first direct and compre-
hensive empirical examination of this question, both in terms of case outcomes and
with regard to the procedures used to dispose of the case.
Utilizing an original database of cases terminating in 29 federal district courts
from 2000 to 2004, I assess the impact that courts of appeals have on district court
decision making after a case is appealed to the circuit court and then returned to
the district court on remand. I find that appellate courts do impact district courts,
both in terms of the parties that win and in the disposition methods that take place.
In particular, the specificity of appellate court directions given to district courts are
an important determinant of impact, as is the appellate court decision to publish
the opinion remanding the case to the district court. With the ability to speak to
the nuances of impact, this study has implications not just for those litigating in
these lower federal courts, but also for a broader view of the effectiveness of federal
courts and hierarchical constraints and our overall perceptions of judicial fairness and
legitimacy.
3.1 The Hierarchical Setting
Modern circuit courts are central actors in the federal appellate system. Indeed,
while these courts have always served as the first line of appellate review in the
federal system, they are increasingly “the de facto (if not the de jure) venue for final
48
appellate review” (Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006, 89). While we can point
to a number of reasons for this shift in appellate importance, the primary candidate
is likely the Supreme Court’s shrinking docket, now with only 75-80 cases granted
certiorari per year.
These appellate courts have been the subject of quite a bit of scholarship over
the past few years, including on the decision to dissent (Hettinger, Lindquist and
Martinek, 2004), the presence of en banc decisions (Giles, Walker and Zorn, 2006),
the adoption of legal rules (Klein, 2002), inter-panel dynamics (Cross and Tiller, 1998;
Boyd, Epstein and Martin, 2007; Sunstein et al., 2006), and variation in decisions
over time (Kaheny, Haire and Benesh, 2008). While much of this work alludes to
the hierarchical role played by circuit courts, this work largely avoids modeling the
interactions of circuit courts with their judicial subordinates. Thus, although these
studies have come a long way in informing us on these hierarchical encounters, they
are not able to speak to the broader impact that courts of appeals have on lower
court decision making. For approximately three-quarters of appeals heard by courts
of appeals, “subordinate” means the federal district courts (Administrative Office of
U.S. Courts, 2007).
While studying the decisions and actions of the federal courts in isolation may be
interesting, the more important inquiry, or at least one with broader implications, is
whether the actions and rulings of circuit courts have a lasting impact and can influ-
ence future law and litigant experiences and public perceptions of the courts. Indeed,
the nature and health of the relationship of district courts to these appellate courts
has “consequences both for immediate litigants and for shaping the legal landscape”
(Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006, 27). Because of this, it is important to
turn to the interactions that courts of appeals have with their federal subordinates.
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In the federal judiciary, the 94 district courts are the face of justice for most
litigants.1 In recent years, district courts have been disposing of well over 300,000
cases per year (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2007). Appellate courts,
with a burden to hear cases in panels and provide lengthy and thoughtful reasoning
for every disposition, are simply not equipped to handle the case management and
record development that is done solely in the courts of first instance, the trial courts.
Because of this critical filtering function, district courts are an invaluable institution
within the judiciary. Their positions also enable them to make law (e.g. Mather, 1995;
Lyles, 1995b) and serve as primary implementers of national policies (e.g. Giles and
Walker, 1975; Vines, 1964). And, yet, of all the federal courts, district courts have
certainly received the least amount of attention from political scientists.
While a district court case is proceeding, the judge and the parties have no idea
whether the case will ultimately end up before the appellate courts. This means that
appellate courts likely serve as an ever-present influence in case dispositions. District
court judges are likely to account for the preferences of the higher court judges when
making their decisions (Randazzo, 2003), and the litigants are likely to weigh their
chances of success before these higher courts when deciding how to proceed in the
lower court (and whether perhaps to actively pursue settlement) (see e.g. Priest and
Klein, 1984).
1Like the circuit courts, district courts hold their jurisdiction based on their geographic location.
Cases come to these courts not only based on original federal filings but also on removal from state
courts. For details regarding the rules that govern district court filings and procedure, see the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Kim et al. (See also 2009b) for other more general details on the business
of these courts.
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3.2 Judicial Impact in the Hierarchy
3.2.1 Impact in Theory
While we know some about the proclivity of appellate courts to affirm or re-
verse district court decisions (e.g. Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006; Haire,
Lindquist and Songer, 2003; Smith, 2006) or to utilize the precedent of higher courts
(e.g. Baum, 1980; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006), we know very little about the impact
that courts of appeals decisions have on these lower courts. This latter inquiry is just
as important since when the preferences of appellate courts have an impact on district
courts, litigants, judges, and the public are all influenced, both in terms of actions
and perceptions. If appellate courts impact district courts, we should expect that
appellate courts will shape the legal policy that governs the decisions made in the
lower courts. For litigants, this congruent hierarchical legal system provides stability
and, often, predictability in expectations. And, since district courts are the ones
handling the mass of cases and are the face of justice for litigants, the question of
whether these courts, as subordinates, are constrained and impacted by circuit court
preferences is important.
Theoretical frameworks from the study of courts and other political institutions
provide a good backdrop for understanding when and why courts of appeals should
have an impact on district court outcomes and proceedings. Many of these expecta-
tions come from the hierarchical nature of the relationship between these two judicial
institutions, with courts of appeals standing in authority over district courts. The
presence of this formalized relationship is particularly important in the judicial sys-
tem. Since courts are generally believed to be weak, toothless implementers (Johnson,
1979; Baum, 1976), district courts, like other institutions external to the judiciary,
need to credibly believe that their appellate superior will stand by and enforce its
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rulings. Under a theory of principal-agency interactions, superiors, like courts of ap-
peals, have the potential, if effective, to control the output of their subordinates, like
district courts.
Principal-agency theory argues that due to limited resources and information,
principals delegate tasks and decision making to agents (Holmstrom, 1979). The the-
ory continues that only properly incentivized agents will avoid shirking and effectively
serve their principals (Miller, 2005). Through this service, district courts can dissem-
inate the legal policy preferences of the courts of appeals while the circuit courts only
conduct “fire alarm” oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984) through the appellate
process. The lifetime appointments held by federal judges may make them imperfect
vessels to act as agents in principal-agency theory, but because many of the character-
istics native to principal-agency theory are present between the hierarchically-situated
courts of appeals and district courts (such as effective monitoring and tools of pun-
ishment), we have evidence that strongly supports the application of the theory to
district court-circuit court relationships (Haire, Lindquist and Songer, 2003, 147).
Circuit courts can sanction district courts in a number of ways. A primary way
that district judges are controlled by circuit judges is through reversals, since such an
outcome overturns a district judge’s decision and, when accompanied by a remand,
adds additional work to the judge. Caminker (1994) argues that lower court judges
want to avoid reversals because of the reputational costs. Very connected to this,
circuit judges will on occasion use their opinions to personally criticize the work of
the district judge in the case. It is far more common for circuit judges to be collegial
and withhold personal statements about district court judges or to express support,
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even in the face of reversals or vacations,2 so these criticisms, when they happen, are
likely to be particularly troubling.
District court judges are also often highly motivated to be elevated to the courts of
appeals (Caminker, 1994; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006), something that
for district judges is a very real possibility. Thus, the high likelihood of judge elevation
from district courts to appellate courts, the existence of strong precedential norms,
and the potential for appellate reversals of district court decisions (and the additional
district court work required by remands) all work to transform district court judges
into appropriate agents within principal-agency theory (Haire, Lindquist and Songer,
2003, 147).
3.2.2 Impact in Action: Outcome-Based and Procedural
Studying the impact of higher courts on lower courts or political bodies has a long
history in judicial politics. These studies are largely concerned with effects on policies
and outcomes, with findings including that the Supreme Court influences the policies
that administrative agencies and courts of appeals implement (Spriggs, 1996) and
that the Supreme Court impacts outcomes in lower federal courts (e.g. Baum, 1978;
Gruhl, 1980; Johnson, 1979; Songer, 1987). This body of previous work certainly
points to the potential for appellate courts to bring about a substantive impact in
the policies and outcomes of their agents. When thinking about courts of appeals’
impact on district court cases, these appellate courts will certainly have an impact if
they cause a change in the party that ultimately wins the case.
2For example, in Darst-Webbe Tenant Association Board v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 339
F.3d 702 (8th 2003), the circuit court, in vacating the district court’s decision, noted that “[w]e
sympathize with the difficult situation the district court faced in resolving this complicated case.”
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Of course, impact can also be felt in more subtle ways than changing the outcome.
For district court litigation, such an impact may come through the proceedings that
take place and the ultimate method by which a case is disposed of. While litigant
satisfaction and perceptions of fairness are surely at their highest when victory is
achieved, those encountering the judicial system can come away from their experi-
ence with varying levels of satisfaction and perceptions of justice depending on the
procedures in place. More generally, Tyler and Huo (2002) suggest that when legal
processes are perceived as fair, people are more likely to perceive the law as legitimate.
Within trial courts, parties will often choose to settle their cases rather than allow the
court to control the case outcome. While this settlement process by necessity involves
compromise, the component of control increases litigant satisfaction. Similarly, Lind
et al. (1990) find that litigants perceived trials as dignified procedures that produced
fair outcomes.
If an appellate court’s intervention can alter the procedures that lead to a case’s
termination, surely this too is impact that litigants can appreciate. Settlement and
even trial allude to a more “fair shot” of justice, enabling litigants to come away
from the judicial system, even as losers, with a sense of fairness and a feeling that
the legal system embodies legitimacy and provides an opportunity for them to air
their disputes. Impact of this typology may even be more critical for federal courts to
embody, since this allows the judiciary to maintain an influential, policy making role
over American society and be perceived as legitimate institutions – a characteristic
necessary for judicial success and stability (see Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998).
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3.3 Tools of Impact
While an ideal system might allow district courts to always perfectly perceive the
preferences of courts of appeals, changing preferences, along with shifting court mem-
bership, random appellate panel assignment, and an evolving external environment,
mean that some degree of uncertainty will exist. Written opinions from circuit courts
can serve to help close this gap of uncertainty. Courts of appeals have a number
of ways to signal their preferences to lower courts and impact the decisions made
in these courts, the most explicit means of which is likely through written opinions.
Through these opinions, appellate courts can denounce lower court behavior and le-
gal interpretation, signal changing preferences, develop legal parameters, and provide
instructions for future decision making.
The content of appellate opinions can vary greatly. While the results of this are
wide-reaching, one major implication is that lower courts, using these opinions as
guidance in proceedings below, will have varying amounts of discretion in how they
carry out the circuit courts’ mandates. And, as a number of scholars have argued,
as judicial opinions become more specified in nature, implementation of higher court
goals and policies becomes more likely (Spriggs, 1996; Baum, 1980; Wasby, 1970).
When courts of appeals write opinions with very specific directions as to, for example,
the procedures and case development that need to take place in the trial court, lower
courts have limited discretion in the actions that they can take while remaining in
good favor with the higher court. However, highly specified decisions are costly for
appellate courts and tend to be inflexible (Spriggs, 1996). And, particularly in the
context of remands, highly specific opinions require courts of appeals judges to step
out of their traditional role as appellate judges and instead, think as if they were trial
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judges. As opinions are written with less specific directions, district courts pick up
increasing amounts of discretion on the behavior that they can partake in.
Hypothesis 1a (Outcome Model): As the circuit court provides increasingly specific
directions, we should be more likely to see a change in the case’s winner from pre-
appeal to post-remand.
Hypothesis 1b (Procedures Model): Highly specific directions should decrease the like-
lihood of a case changing termination procedures. Excluding highly specific directions,
more opinion specificity should increase the likelihood of a case changing termination
procedures.
In addition to the language utilized in its decisions, the circumstances surrounding
appellate court opinions can serve to signal their strength to lower courts. For exam-
ple, circuit courts of appeals can mandate whether their opinions should be published.
Although each circuit has different rules with regard to opinion publication, the tone
and content of these rules is essentially the same: the circuit panel may designate a
decision as “not for publication” when it is determined to not have precedential value
(e.g. 11th Circuit R. 36-2 and IOP 6). Until 2007, each circuit set its own rules on if
and when unpublished opinions could be cited. Starting in 2007, the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure now mandate that all unpublished circuit decisions can be cited
by parties (Fed. R. App. Proc. 32.1). The ability to designate decisions as unpub-
lished, even under the new rules of citation, mean that a circuit panel is declaring an
opinion to be of less long-term value and general utility.
Hypothesis 2 : A circuit court’s decision not to publish an opinion should decrease the
likelihood of impact.
Similarly, judges serving on a panel with one another reserve the right to dissent
from the majority’s opinion. Dissenting opinions signal that there was discord among
the circuit judges in resolving the case. They may also indicate to a district court
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judge that there is room to shirk and that there may be limited repercussions if he
fails to implement the changes that the majority opinion specifies. To put it another
way, circuit court oversight is more likely to be viewed as credible and constraining
when the panel speaks in one voice about the law and necessary directions on remand
(Spriggs, 1996; Baum, 1980). And particularly for a district court judge observing the
opinions of a circuit panel, dissensus may also impart doubt that the panel majority’s
opinion represents the views of the circuit majority. The presence of a dissenting judge
at the courts of appeals may negate the ability of the panel majority to impact district
court decision making. By stating reasons for his disagreement with the majority in
writing, the dissenter provides a district court judge, perhaps already unhappy with
the stigma of reversal, hope that his case management and outcome preferences need
not sway (entirely) with the directions of the appellate panel.
Hypothesis 3 : The presence of a dissenting opinion should decrease the likelihood of
impact.
In thinking about the relationship between these courts, we would be remiss to
not consider ideology and its possible dampening effect on impact. A long line of
judicial scholarship posits that federal judges at all levels make decisions based, at
least in part, on their policy preferences (e.g. Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Rowland and
Carp, 1996). In the context of impact, how much of an impact courts of appeals
have through intervention in a case and how willing district courts are to follow the
directives of circuit courts can arguably be explained by how similar the ideological
interests of these actors are. Stated more formally,
Hypothesis 4 : An increase in the ideological distance between the district court judge
and the circuit court judges (in the majority) should decrease the likelihood of impact.
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3.4 Data & Methods
To capture the impact that courts of appeals have on district court decision mak-
ing, I turn to a newly collected dataset of 1,045 cases remanded to 29 federal district
courts from the circuit courts of appeals. These cases are an ideal outlet for examin-
ing impact both in terms of case outcome and, as an alternative measure of litigant
satisfaction, in terms of the differing procedures utilized in the latter outcome.
Previous studies of impact related to district courts have been hampered by data
limitations. While traditional studies of judicial impact reflect on the movement of a
case through the judicial hierarchy or the positive citation to appellate decisions by
lower courts, such a research design is troubling with regard to federal district courts.
Most district court cases resolve via settlement, so there simply is no judge decision
or opinion. For those cases terminating by some alternative means, judges have no
burden to author opinions or if they choose to write, publish those opinions, meaning
that using traditional research techniques, there will often be no written record of
the impact of appellate decisions on a district court outcome. Scholars usually search
sources such as Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw for their cases, but, again, these sources will
not reflect the presence of cases terminated without published opinions.
The research designed employed in this study enables me to study the impact
that courts of appeals have on all types of district court cases — even those that
end in settlement. To do this, I identified the population of district court data using
the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) Integrated Databases for 2000-2004 compiled by
the FJC from standardized filing and termination information reported from district
court clerks of court for every case terminated in the district courts. These data
were then merged with the corresponding data from the Appellate Terminations and
Pending Databases (also from the FJC), thus yielding the population of cases that
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were appealed from the district courts to the courts of appeals. From this list of cases,
I collected the circuit court method of disposition to find all final appeals that were
eventually remanded to the district court (reverse and remand, vacate and remand,
and partial versions of each). After a case was identified as having a remand, the
dispositions of the case in the district court before and after the appeal was collected.
All case coding was conducted using district court and appellate court dockets as
well as courts of appeals opinions, and where necessary to surmise the method of case
termination, district court orders, memorandums, and opinions.
This project seeks to improve on the data collection shortcomings of previous
projects studying some aspect of district court decision making, thus enabling the
findings of this research project to be both generalizable and wide-reaching. To do
this, I collect a breadth of data along a number of continuums, including data from
30 district courts across 13 broad issue areas. Many existing studies analyze only a
small number of districts (e.g. Waldfogel, 1998, SDNY; Smith, 2006, DDC). In the
past, before electronic case dockets were available, researchers had to make copies of
individual dockets in each district’s courthouse. With today’s nearly universal reliance
on PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records”) by district courts, such
geographic limitations are no longer necessary. As a result, this study collects data
on an unprecedented number of districts across all multi-member circuits, something
that is potentially very important given the local norms that exist within individual
districts. As displayed in Table 3.1, data are collected from 29 of the 94 federal district
courts, and all of the traditional, geographically-based circuit courts but the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are represented. The districts included
in the study were selected simply because they provide circuit and geographic diversity
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and because the chief judges agreed to provide me fee exemptions for studying the
case materials from their courts.3
3Note that of the district courts to be studied here, the chief judges (who granted me free PACER
access) have varied ideological backgrounds (one Carter appointee, ten Reagan appointees, four Bush
I appointees, ten Clinton appointees, and four Bush II appointees).
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1st Circuit 2nd Circuit 3rd Circuit 4th Circuit 5th Circuit 6th Circuit
DME SDNY MDPA DMD NDTX NDOH
DRI EDNY DDE WDNC EDLA EDMI
EDVA WDTN
7th Circuit 8th Circuit 9th Circuit 10th Circuit 11th Circuit
NDIL EDMO WDWA DCO MDFL
NDIN NDIA CDCA DKS NDFL
DSD DMT NDOK NDGA
MDAL
Table 3.1: The 29 federal district courts, arranged by their circuit, included
in the study.
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For many years, scholars studying district courts focused only on the small num-
ber of cases with decisions published in the Federal Supplement. For a district court
judge, the decision to publish a decision is wholly discretionary, and the resulting
published cases appear to be in no way a random sample of all district court deci-
sions (Songer, 1988; Siegelman and Donohue III, 1990; Swenson, 2004; Ringquist and
Emmert, 1999). Following in the footsteps of these scholars recognizing the potential
import of unpublished district decisions, and, by encompassing settled disputes, cases
that yield neither published nor unpublished opinions, along with those terminated
via court oversight, this project has potential for broad applicability. A simple ex-
amination of the disposition types within the present study, depicted in Figure 3.1,
clarifies how much data would be lost if this study were to be conducted in the tra-
ditional fashion – through searches of case opinions on Lexis or Westlaw. While a
very small proportion of the data end in settlement prior to appeal, approximately
one-half of the cases terminate via settlement after remand. These settled cases would
be invisible to scholars using traditional techniques. And, yet, as will be discussed in
greater detail below, these settlements are a part of the impact that courts of appeals
have on district court decision making.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of cases in data terminating by settlement or trial/non-
trial adjudication, pre-appeal and post-remand. Cases terminating by set-
tlement are represented in light grey and those ending by trial or non-trial
adjudication are depicted in dark grey.
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Nearly all work on district courts limits itself to narrow issue areas. Although this
limitation is frequently appropriate when one’s research is driven by a substantive
question based on a particular area of law, such work has limited generalizability.
This is particularly the case for work that seeks to address broad issues of a legal
and/or political nature. With this in mind, this project will study three large issue
areas, identified based on their Nature of Suit (NOS) code.4 To be studied here
are: civil rights cases, personal injury torts, and a variety of business-related cases,
including general contracts, copyrights, patents, and trademarks.5
3.4.1 Dependent Variables
As noted above, the impact of courts of appeals can happen both through changes
in outcomes (“substantive impact”) and through changes in the procedures by which
cases terminate (“procedural impact”). To study these two types of impact, I rely on
two dichotomous dependent variables: change in winner and change in disposition
type.
The variable for change in winner is coded as 1 when the district court case
prior to appeal has a different winning party than after remand and 0 otherwise.
Generally speaking, defining the winning party is easy. For district cases prior to
appeal, usually only one party appeals the case outcome, so that party is defined as
the loser. If more than one party appeals, the winner is the party whose outcome
is affirmed on appeal. For cases ending in settlement, the plaintiff is defined as the
winner, as is the case post-remand when there is mixed relief. Approximately 58
4The NOS code is a issue area classification for a case. It is assigned to the case based on the
identification by the plaintiff’s attorney filing the case when he fills out his Civil Cover Sheet.
5The exact NOS codes are: civil rights cases (440, 442, 443, 444), personal injury cases (310, 320,
340, 350, 360), and business-related cases (190, 820, 830, 840).
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percent of the cases in the dataset have a change in the case’s winner from pre-appeal
to post-remand.
Turning to change in disposition type, this variable represents a change from
one of three types of disposition to another from the termination of the case prior
to appeal to after remand. The three types of disposition are settlement, non-trial
adjudication, and trial. Prior to appeal, nearly all cases (85 percent) terminate by
non-trial adjudications (generally summary judgments and involuntary dismissals)
while after remand, the majority of cases (just over 50 percent) end with settlements.
Within my data, over 61 percent of the cases have a change in disposition.
3.4.2 Independent Variables and Expectations
Variables of Interest
As noted above, opinions (and the directions within), publication status of the
opinions, and written dissents from opinions are all means by which circuit courts
may be able to impact district court decision making and procedures on remand.
To account for the specificity of directions in appellate court opinions, I code four
dummy variables. These variables, High Opinion Specificity, Medium-High Opinion
Specificity, Medium Opinion Specificity, and Low Opinion Specificity, represent four
different levels of specificity in the directions within circuit court opinions. The
definitions of each of these four levels of direction specificity, along with examples
characterizing them, are provided in Table 3.2 and the inter-coder reliability for the
coding of this variable is provided in Table 3.3. Within the data, 61 percent of the
cases are considered to be of low specificity, while 18 percent are of medium specificity,
11 percent have high specificity, and 10 percent are of medium-high specificity.
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Specificity Opinion Characteristics Representative
of Directions Examples
High Explicit directions on what outcome
district court should reach on remand
“Remand with instructions
to dismiss the federal action”
Medium-High Specific directions given with regard
to some district court actions or par-
tial outcomes, but the court of ap-
peals does not direct the final out-
come of the case
“Remand for a new trial lim-
ited to age discrimination
claims”; “On remand the dis-
trict court should award costs
to Metropolitan or state rea-
sons why costs should be de-
nied”
Medium Directions regarding procedures that
should take place but no explicit di-
rections on the final or partial out-
comes of the case
“Remand for further dis-
covery to allow 100% Girls
Brand the opportunity to
discover evidence of Hilson’s
possible wrongful conduct in
refusing to consent to the
proposed sublease”
Low The court of appeal’s directions on re-
mand are either non-existent (other
than the statement that the previ-
ous outcome is nullified) or merely
provide suggestions or hints on what
might need to be considered as the
case progresses
“Remand is required to re-
solve factual questions con-
sistent with this opinion”;
“Remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this
opinion”
Table 3.2: The specificity of directions in courts of appeals opinions
for the cases in this dataset. Representative examples of each type
of specificity are drawn from the author’s data.
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Opinion Expected Agreement Observed
Specificity (By Chance) Agreement
Kappa
High 77% 97.6% 0.89
Medium-High 79.5% 93.8% 0.7
Medium 66.4% 89.3% 0.68
Low 53% 89.6% 0.78
Table 3.3: Intercoder reliability for the coding of Opinion Specificity. The
Kappa statistic ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being a perfect value.
67
Opinion publication status is coded dichotomously, with unpublished opinions
coded as 1. Within my data, unpublished cases account for 43 percent of the cases.
Similarly, the presence of a dissenting opinion is coded dichotomously. 8 percent of
the cases within the dataset have the presence of a dissent.
Finally, I code Difference in Ideology to operationalize the ideological damp-
ening effect hypothesis. This variable represents the absolute difference in the ide-
ologies of the district court judge and the circuit panel’s majority. To measure this
difference, I collect the Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores for these actors, a vari-
able coded using the methodology described in the Giles et al. (2001) and Epstein et
al. (2007) papers. In short, these scores are the Poole and Rosenthal NOMINATE
Common Space score (available at http://voteview.com/readmeb.htm) of the senator
from a judge’s home state (or average of the two senators) if that senator(s) is from
the same party as the appointing president. If neither senator is from the same party
as the president, the judge is assigned the Common Space score of the appointing
president. The resulting computed ideology scores range from -1 (the most liberal)
to 1 (the most conservative).
For the district court judges in my dataset, the JCS score is collected for the judge
presiding over the case at the termination of the case after remand. For the cases in
the dataset where the assigned district court judge in the case is a magistrate judge
rather than an Article III district court judge, an additional step was taken to capture
ideology. Since magistrates are appointed to their position (for eight years) by a vote
of the active judges in their district, I code the ideology of these actors by taking the
median district court judge JCS score for the year that they assumed their position.
For the courts of appeals score, I collected the individual JCS scores (available from
Epstein et al. 2007) for the judges in the majority and then computed the median
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for each majority panel. Difference in Ideology values range from 0 to 1.07, with
a median ideological difference of 0.365.
Control Variables
While the opinions of appellate courts and ideological differences may be a strong
impetus of impact, other institutional factors and actor characteristics may also influ-
ence changes in outcome and procedures in federal district courts following a remand.
Because of this, I control for a number of likely suspects across these areas.
Ninth Circuit: With so few of their cases subject to Supreme Court review,
district court judges are likely to rarely forgo the preferences of their immediate ap-
pellate court principal, the circuit court, for the potential preferences of the Supreme
Court. It is possible, however, that district court judges serving in the Ninth Circuit
are far more cognizant of the preferences of Supreme Court justices. It is this circuit,
of course, that receives a large amount of Supreme Court attention, largely in the
form of reversals. Because of this high reversal rate, district court judges, both in
terms of precedent and with regard to elevation considerations, may be hesitant to
attach themselves too closely to the circuit.
Female District Judge: Female judges are likely to want to increase (or not
decrease) their chances of elevation to the circuit courts (since appointing qualified
women to these courts is such a politically hotbed issue). In addition, given the
theories on female decision making (see also Sherry, 1986; George, 2001; Resnik,
1988; Karst, 1984; Gilligan, 1982), it is quite plausible that female district court
judges, based upon their social and background experiences and their communication
and problem solving skills, will be more apt to dispose of the cases before them
by settlement than will male judges. This propensity may increase even more so
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on remand after circuit courts have opened up the opportunity for additional case
proceedings.
District Judge Years on Bench: Measured in years as a district court judge,
this variable provides an important measure of the differing concerns that district
judges may have as they serve on the bench. If elevation to an appellate court is
a judge’s desire, we would expect judges that are relatively new to the bench to
embrace outcome change following circuit court intervention in a case. After being
on the bench for many years, however, a district judge’s chances of elevation are
likely to greatly diminish, and so too might the judge’s concerns about following the
circuit’s preferences for change. Within my data, this time on bench variable ranges
from less than one year to 42 years, with a median of 10 years. When it comes to
procedural change, newer judges may be less accustomed to the features the enable a
change in case dispositions, especially when it comes to encouraging parties to settle.
Magistrate Assigned Case: Magistrates, serving as the presiding judge in civil
cases by the consent of the parties, are likely to desire elevation as well – only this
time they want appointment to the district courts. And, indeed, many current dis-
trict court judges were once magistrates. These judges are likely to be particularly
concerned about avoiding drawing negative attention to themselves. This should lead
them to be more likely to change case outcomes on remand. Similarly, because of
their training in handling pre-trial matters and presiding over things like settlement
conferences, these judges are also likely to help cases resolve by a changed disposition
type on remand.
New District Judge on Remand: A number of circuits, by default, assign cases
to a new district court on remand. When this is the case, we should expect that
change will be more likely. A new judge will not be tied to the decision making made
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by the original district judge in the case and thus will be more likely to implement
change on remand.
Pro Se Litigant (Loser Below): By their very nature, these litigants are weak.
They represent themselves and often file frivolous lawsuits. In this dataset, their
disputes may not be wholly frivolous (the circuit courts do reverse the trial courts’
decisions to dismiss the cases), but it is likely that the cases are often proceeding
solely to provide a few additional constitutional protections. In my data, nearly 21
percent of the cases have a pro se litigant (generally plaintiff) that lost the dispute
below. The presence of these weak parties in a case should make change less likely.
Finally, because this study incorporates three broad issue areas, civil rights,
business, and torts, controlling for them ensures that any results are not driven by
qualities that might be unique to only one area.
3.5 Modeling & Results
Both impact inquires will be modeled using probit regression. Turning first to an
inquiry of substantive impact, where the dependent variable is change in winner,
the results are provided in Figure 3.2. The model does a decent job of predicting
outcomes, with nearly 61 percent correctly predicted and a reduction of error of over
5 percent.
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Figure 3.2: Nomogram of probit regression results for the effects on change
in a case’s winner from pre-appeal to post-remand. Solid dots represent the
coefficients on the estimates while the solid line around those dots are a 95
% confidence interval. When the confidence interval intersects with the dot-
ted vertical line located at 0, the estimate is not statistically significant at
(p<0.05, two-tailed). High Opinion Specificity and Tort Cases are base-
line variables and are excluded from the model. A traditional regression table
is available in the appendix.
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In contrast to predictions, some of the variables do not reach statistical signifi-
cance. However, for a number of the variables that are central to this study, the results
are statistically significant and in the predicted direction. These include highly spe-
cific appellate court directions, unpublished circuit court opinions, and the presence
of two actors: a magistrate assigned to the case and a weak pro se litigant. To grasp
a better understanding of the substantive effect of these variables, I present an array
of predicted probability graphs in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The predicted probability that a case will have a change in winner
from pre-appeal to post-remand based on the opinion publication status and
the presence of a weak, pro se litigant. The black markings represent cases
with a presiding district court judge, while the grey markings represent cases
where a magistrate has been assigned. The circles/squares represent the mean
predicted probability of change while the lines represent 95% confidence inter-
vals around those predictions. All other variable values are held at their mean
or modal values.
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Figure 3.3 plots the predicted probability of a modal case having a change in
winner based on the four types of circuit court opinion specificity present in a decision
(both published and unpublished). The graphic includes the probability of change
both when a traditional district court judge is assigned to the case (black line) and
when a magistrate officially presides (grey line). In the top panel of Figure 3.3, we can
see that for cases remanded to district courts with a published circuit court opinion
with highly specific directions, the probability of the case winner changing from prior
to the appeal is nearly 0.8. This number increases to 0.85 when the district case is
presided over by a magistrate rather than an Article III district judge. When the
circuit court opinion has less specific directions, this number falls to between 0.6
and 0.65 for cases assigned to district judges and 0.7 to 0.8 for cases assigned to
magistrates. These numbers include a slight increase in the probability of change for
those cases with non-specific directions (e.g. “for proceedings consistent with this
opinion”) (as compared to those cases with specificity of directions in the middle
range).
The trends for those cases represented in the middle (for unpublished circuit court
decisions) and bottom (for unpublished opinions with the presence of a pro se litigant
who lost below) panels of Figure 3.3 are similar to those for the top panel; however,
across the board, the predicted probabilities for change in case winner are substan-
tially lower. For example, for the middle panel, we can see that highly specified
opinions presided over by a district judge have a probability of change around 0.65.
For the bottom panel, this number drops to around 0.55.
These depictions help clarify the impact that courts of appeals have on district
courts. In particular, the opinions of circuit courts are important determinants of the
likelihood of change in district court outcome. When circuit courts provide very spe-
cific directions in their opinions, district courts are far more likely to change the cases’
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outcomes than when the circuit courts leave the district courts plentiful discretion for
action.
Similarly, a circuit court panel’s decision to publish an opinion has a strong effect
on district court outcome change. The predicted probabilities for modal cases with
unpublished circuit opinions are depicted in the middle panel of Figure 3.3. No matter
the level of circuit court opinion specificity, an unpublished opinion makes it about
10 percent less likely that the district court outcome will change from pre-appeal to
post-remand.
The characteristics of the actors is important to impact as well. Nearly across
the board, magistrates presiding over district cases are more likely – anywhere from 5
percent to 30 percent – to have their cases change in outcome than traditional district
judges. With solid excuses to be elevation-minded, it is no surprise that these judges
pursue a course of action that avoids controversy and makes them appear as good
agents. It is also consistent with predictions that cases with weak litigants with no
formalized representation are far less likely than modal cases to change outcomes.
I turn next to a model of procedural impact, where the dependent variable is
change in disposition type. The results of this model are presented in Figure
3.4. This regression model has a 68 percent prediction rate and reduces error by
nearly 17 percent.
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Figure 3.4: Nomogram of probit regression results for the effects on change
in a case’s termination method from pre-appeal to post-remand. Solid dots
represent the coefficients on the estimates while the solid line around those dots
are a 95 % confidence interval. When the confidence interval intersects with
the dotted vertical line located at 0, the estimate is not statistically significant
at (p<0.05, two-tailed). High Opinion Specificity and Tort Cases are
baseline variables and are excluded from the model. A traditional regression
table is available in the appendix.
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Once again, my expectations are met with mixed results. I find no support for
my ideological distance hypothesis, as is the case for my expectations with regard to
district court actors (time on bench, new district judge on remand, magistrate, female)
and Supreme Court threat of intervention (Ninth Circuit). However, appellate court
opinions are once again a major determinate of impact. The same is true for weak
litigants.
Based on the changing values of these significant variables, the predicted probabil-
ities of change in disposition type are depicted in Figure 3.5. As with the substantive
impact figure, the plots are arranged by the changing levels of appellate court opin-
ion specificity, the publication status of opinions, and the presence of a weak pro se
litigant. Since the presence of a magistrate assigned to the case does not have a sta-
tistically significant effect, the plots only present the probabilities for cases presided
over by district judges. At first glance, these predicted probabilities seem to indicate
that courts of appeals may not have an impact on changing the procedures that lead
to a case’s termination. After all, for opinions that are highly specific in nature,
the likelihood of disposition method change ranges from only 10 percent to about
30 percent. However, cases with very specific directions, by their very definition,
include directions on how the cases should be disposed of (see Table 3.2). Since the
appellate courts are not likely to direct that the case be disposed of by, for example,
settlement, these circuit courts are envisioning termination via non-trial adjudica-
tion. Since most cases going to the circuit courts on appeal reach there by non-trial
adjudication, seeing a change in disposition in these circumstances is not likely.
Because of this, I instead turn the focus to the three other degrees of circuit
court opinion directions and the procedural impact connected to them. In so doing,
we can see that circuit court opinions of “medium-high” specificity are particularly
good at bringing about procedural change in district courts. Less specific appellate
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court opinions have somewhat lower levels of procedural impact, with the likelihood
of disposition change being 5 to 10 percent lower in these cases.
Just as with outcomes, the decision of an appellate court to publish its opinion
has a very strong impact on the change in case procedures following remand. Cases
with published appellate opinions are at least 10 percent more likely to have a change
in disposition type following remand. The combined effect of the choice of whether
to publish an opinion and how specific to be in the directions given to the district
court lead to quite a large procedural effect. A published opinion with medium
high specificity has a 72 percent chance of leading to a change in the district court
disposition method while an unpublished opinion with medium specificity has a 52
percent chance. When we account for weak, pro se litigants (the bottom panel of
Figure 3.5), these disparities grow even further.
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Figure 3.5: The predicted probability that a case will have a change in dispo-
sition type from pre-appeal to post-remand. The top panel represents cases
with published opinions, the middle panel depicts unpublished opinion cases,
and the bottom panel shows unpublished opinion cases with a weak, pro se
litigant. The black markings represent cases with a district court judge pre-
siding over the case. The circles represent the mean predicted probability of
change while the lines represent 95% confidence intervals on those predictions.
All other variable values are held at their mean or modal values
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3.6 Discussion
This article attempts to bring new insight into the ever-present question of judi-
cial politics — how much of an impact do higher courts have on the decision making
of lower courts. The research design and data provide a fresh and comprehensive
approach to this question, enabling it to be assessed for a systematic sample of dis-
trict court cases for both substantive and procedural impact. The results are quite
illustrative about the overarching impact that courts of appeals have over their hi-
erarchical agents—the federal district courts. After comparing district court cases
pre-appeal to post-remand, this impact comes in two important ways: a change in
who wins the case and a change in the method by which the case terminates. I find
that courts of appeals, through the specificity of directions provided in their opinions
and the decision about whether to published their opinions, have a substantial impact
on district courts. By using these tools, courts of appeals can increase the likelihood
of a case having a change by nearly 30 percent.
The implications of these findings are vast. These results indicate, for example,
that the federal judicial hierarchy is healthy and that, generally speaking, district
court judges are good and faithful agents that tend to defer to their superiors’ pre-
sumed preferences even when they are given vast discretion. Similarly, these results
should give hope to those in favor of predictability and stability in the law as directed
by the appellate courts.
The findings also indicate that the politics of judicial appointments remain an
important concern. Although the variables for ideological difference were not sta-
tistically significant, the fact that the appellate courts were able to implement their
preferences on district courts regardless of how ideologically distant those lower court
judges were from them means that politically extreme circuit judges (or panels) may
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be able to implement sweeping changes in the trial-level policies of our judiciary. At
the same time, the strong findings with regard to the specificity of directions in circuit
court opinions indicate that opinion language matters. This should thus provide an
additional layer of complexity to existing research on the bargaining that exists (or
is theorized to exist) among circuit judges over the texts of their opinions.
And, last but certainly not least, these results are important for our overall percep-
tion of the courts. Generally speaking, the federal judiciary is a political institution
that is held in high regard by the public (Gibson, 1989). With a finding that circuit
courts are able to impact district court disposition procedures — and do so in a way
that is likely to increase litigant satisfaction with the process — we should expect
that perceptions of judicial legitimacy will be retained as long as the judicial hierarchy
remains strong.
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3.7 Appendix: Traditional Regression Tables
3.7.1 Probit Regression Results for Change in Winner
Coefficient Robust Standard Error
Medium-High Opinion Specificity -0.498* 0.18
Medium Opinion Specificity -0.498* 0.15
Low Opinion Specificity -0.334* 0.13
Ideological Distance between COA and DC -0.064 0.14
New District Judge on Remand 0.112 0.13
Presence of COA Dissent -0.037 0.15
Unpublished COA Opinion -0.310* 0.08
Pro Se Litigant (Loser Below) -0.320* 0.10
District Judge Years on Bench -0.004 0.00
Female District Judge -0.163 0.10
Magistrate Assigned Case on Remand 0.351* 0.17
Ninth Circuit 0.090 0.11
Civil Rights Case -0.023 0.13
Business Case 0.015 0.15
Constant 0.836* 0.20
Log Likelihood -683.378
Pseudo R2 0.037
Percent Correctly Predicted 60.57
Percent Reduction in Error 5.29
Observations 1045
Table 3.4: Probit regression results for the effects on change in a case’s winner
from pre-appeal to post-remand. Statistical significance is represented with *
(p<0.05, two-tailed). High Opinion Specificity and Tort Cases are base-
line variables and are excluded from the model.
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3.7.2 Probit Regression Results for Change in Termination
Method
Coefficient Robust Standard Error
Medium-High Opinion Specificity 1.117* 0.19
Medium Opinion Specificity 0.794* 0.16
Low Opinion Specificity 1.020* 0.14
Ideological Distance between COA and DC 0.085 0.14
New District Judge on Remand 0.050 0.13
Presence of COA Dissent 0.118 0.16
Unpublished COA Opinion -0.229* 0.09
Pro Se Litigant (Loser Below) -0.415* 0.10
District Judge Years on Bench -0.006 0.00
Female District Judge -0.005 0.10
Magistrate Assigned Case on Remand 0.222 0.17
Ninth Circuit 0.163 0.11
Civil Rights Case -0.117 0.14
Business Case 0.128 0.15
Constant -0.355 0.20
Log Likelihood -640.355
Pseudo R2 0.080
Percent Correctly Predicted 68.04
Percent Reduction in Error 16.92
Observations 1045
Table 3.5: Probit regression results for the effects on change in a case’s dis-
position method from pre-appeal to post-remand. Statistical significance is
represented with * (p<0.05, two-tailed). High Opinion Specificity and
torts cases are baseline variables and are excluded from the model.
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Chapter 4
Quantifying Appeals
The hierarchical structure present in the American judicial systemt sets the stage
for any decision making that will ultimately take place at our nation’s highest court,
the U.S. Supreme Court. As Atkins (1993, 780) puts it, “[l]ike other political institu-
tions, much of the power exercised by courts centers around their ability to use some
form of sequential decision making to define the agenda for issues considered on the
merits.” Within our judicial institutions, the power to define this future agenda lies
first and foremost with litigants, not judges.
Litigants are faced with many decisions while engaged in legal disputes, including
whether to file suit, whether to settle their case or continue to pursue litigative reme-
dies, and whether to file an appeal after an outcome has been reached in a lower-level
judicial body. It is this latter decision that has the greatest possible potential for
increasing a case’s salience and elevating its potential for overall impact. In addition,
the decision to appeal to an appellate court positions litigants as the only actors
capable of presenting appellate judges with “the range of opportunities within which
[those] judges can actually specify alternatives (Atkins, 1993, 780-81). With the ex-
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tensive focus on appellate decision making in our literature, understanding the process
by which the agendas of those higher courts are formed is particularly important.
Others have argued that studying the decision of litigants to appeal from a lower
court to a higher one is an important, politically relevant one. Seabury (2009) posits,
for example, that the decision of a litigant to appeal activates a system of oversight
in the judicial system, an argument that makes the judicial appeal process seem very
similar to the fire-alarm oversight that Congress has over the Executive Branch (Mc-
Cubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Priest and Klein (1984, 1) also argue that studying
lower court decisions (and appeals from them) is important, but for an entirely dif-
ferent reason. As they put it, “[a]ppellate cases may tell us which disputes courts
find troublesome and which they find easy to decide. But this doctrinal information
discloses very little about how legal rules affect the behavior of those subject to them
or affect the generation of legal disputes themselves.”
A ideal arena for the study of this topic in the American context is with the de-
cision of litigants in the federal district courts, the trial courts and deciders of most
federal cases, to appeal to the federal courts of appeals, the intermediate federal ap-
pellate courts responsible for the final decisions on nearly all federal appeals. Within
civil cases in the federal judiciary, this appeal to a multi-member appellate court
is generally guaranteed, and as such, is considered to be a great, nearly axiomatic,
protection of the American legal system (see Dalton, 1985, quoting Robert Leflar).
While virtually every litigant has the right to appeal at least once, very few
actually do. A recent study of appeals conducted by Eisenberg (2004) found that the
appeal rate in federal civil cases is around 11 percent.1 Given the guaranteed right to
1Approximately half of these appeals are never heard on the merits by the appellate
court. Only 5.6 percent of district court cases are appealed and decided on the merits
by the COA. When Eisenberg limits his analysis to only those cases with a clear
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an appeal and that by most definitions every non-settled case has a loser, why would
the appeal rate from federal trial courts to courts of appeals be so small? As theory
explains and as I explore in more detail below, the choice to mobilize one’s case for
appeal is a strategic, political, and procedural one. After detailing these theories,
I turn to an empirical exploration of them in the judicial system. The results are
rather revealing, indicating that strategy and procedural fairness are both important
considerations in the decision of a litigant to appeal.
4.1 Theorizing Appeals
Political and economic research provides plentiful details on judicial decision mak-
ing and the role of litigants within institutionalized legal disputes. More so that any
other time in the judicial process, in the context of the decision to appeal, litigants’
decision making shapes the judicial agenda. This is particularly true in the lower
tier of the federal judiciary, where losing litigants have a right to appeal their final
judgments from federal district courts to courts of appeals. And, because courts of
appeals are increasingly “the de facto (if not the de jure) venue for final appellate
review” (Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006, 89), studying the process of cases
reaching these courts is particularly critical.
Two broad theories, at times in competition with one another, provide expla-
nations for when litigants will appeal from trial courts to courts of appeals. The
first is based on the strategic considerations of the litigant, defined both in economic
and political terms. The second revolves around alternative motivations of litigation,
victory for the defendant or plaintiff in the lower court, appeal rates rise to 21 percent
(all appeals) and 11.4 percent (appeals that go to merits conclusion).
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whether that be to achieve long-term political change or a sense of justice without
regard to the outcome of the litigation.
4.1.1 Strategic Considerations For Appeal
Litigants, even when they are just potential litigants, face a variety of strategic
calculations when deciding whether to advance their cases through the judicial sys-
tem. Many of these calculations early in a case are shrouded in uncertainty, since
litigants often know a limited amount about the strength of their case relative to
their opponents’ and the chances of their success once the judicial system gets for-
mally involved. As Gross and Syverud (1991, 327) argue, “even a perfect prediction
leaves crucial questions unanswered.” Nonetheless, litigants in trial courts create their
strategy and tailor their actions based on a consideration of “both how the opposing
party will react to a possible move and how the court might rule at trial” (Gross and
Syverud, 1991, 328).
As with litigative activity in and prior to trial courts, the decision to appeal is also
governed by a rational, strategic actor determining if continued action in the legal
system is wise. Posner’s cost-benefit analysis model (see Posner, 1985, 1996) guides
litigants in determining when it is rational for them to appeal. In describing the
decision to appeal in economic terms, Posner famously stated that “everyone prefers
winning to losing and winning big to winning small” (Posner, 1985, 8). Consistent
with this model, a losing litigant will likely evaluate his odds of success and the
reward he would recover if he were to pursue an appeal. However, not all potential
appellants are created equally in their ability to make determinations of rational
appealing behavior. As Songer, Cameron and Segal (1995, 1121), following in the
footsteps of Elder (1989) and Landes (1971), argue, litigants are rational in making
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the decision to appeal to the Supreme Court when they consider their likelihood of
winning and the resources at their disposal. Similar factors are important here.
Galanter’s (1974) work and the numerous related projects that have since followed
establish the important advantages that “haves” hold in the litigation system, par-
ticularly when they face weaker opponents. Empirical research confirms that these
resource and experience-based advantages provide litigants the upper hand in a vari-
ety of litigation settings. These research findings indicate that resource and experience
rich litigants have the ability and patience to be rational actors, both in their liti-
gation within district courts and, upon the conclusion of their case, in determining
whether to seek appeal.
This means that high-statused actors, unlike their one-shotter, individual litigant
counterparts in the case, will be able to better see what appeals will successfully lead
to reversals of lower court decisions. As such, stronger parties, like businesses and gov-
ernments, will not appeal as many cases but, when they do, their likelihood of success
should be higher than weak litigants. As Barclay (1999, 50) puts it, “[b]y selecting
appropriate precedent-setting cases and settling cases that are disadvantageous to
their long-term position, repeat players shape the appellate courts’ case pool, and
through shaping the case pool, they shape subsequently the courts’ decision-making
process.”
While the status of the litigants in isolation tells us a lot about their potential
abilities and strategies within the litigation process, even more telling is the status
of the opposing litigants relative to one another. Coleman’s (1982, 22) theory of
asymmetric relationships posits that the stronger actor “almost always controls most
of the conditions surrounding the relationship.” Such party strength asymmetries
and resulting activity should be present, in various forms, throughout the litigation
system, including in the decision to appeal from the trial court to the appropriate
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appellate court. As Atkins (1993, 782) notes, “since party capability theory empha-
sizes the effects of power differentials between litigants, and especially those in which
stronger parties oppose weaker ones, appeal behavior should also be a function of the
type of litigants that oppose each other in a dispute. Intrinsic to such differentials is
the concept of power asymmetry.”
Weak litigants, like individuals and poor individuals, plagued by inexperience,
caught up in the emotion of litigation and a desire to secure justice, and assisted
by less seasoned counsel, are likely to pursue appeals even when it is not rational
to do so. These appeals, often coming against stronger governmental and business
opponents, are likely the function of the litigants being unable to properly assess their
chances of success on appeal.
Stronger litigants, as noted above, will have an advantage in this arena, since using
their resources and experience, they will be able to account for the appellate court
circumstances that lie ahead. Nonetheless, the ability of these powerful litigants will
also be affected by the relative strength of their opponents. In particular, when strong
litigants oppose other strong litigants in the legal process, uncertainty in outcomes
should increase and, as a result, their aptness for determining future success should
decrease. Within the appellate process, such a relationship means that appeals are
likely to take place with relatively high frequency, especially compared to when a
strong litigant (plaintiff) is facing a weak one (defendant) where the strong party’s
ability to evaluate his circumstances and chances of future success are unmasked by
his opponent’s resources and experience.
Litigants considering an appeal will certainly evaluate the judicial body that they
will be appealing to very carefully. No matter the court of appeals that will take their
appeal, litigants know that the intermediate appellate court faces a high caseload and
a very limited ability to exercise discretion over its agenda. As Posner (1996) argues,
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this means that circuit court judges are naturally going to work to keep caseload
growth in check while making decisions.
One likely product of the federal intermediate appellate court’s design is that
the majority of appeals are affirmed. Of those cases reaching the merits on appeal,
over 90 percent are affirmed (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). When only
considering those cases that yield a published option, the number drops a bit, to
around 70 percent (Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 2000). Either way that one looks at
the numbers, though, the prospect of a successful appeal is a tall order for a potential
appellant.
For litigants wishing to rationally and strategically try their odds in an appellate
court, a consideration of the judges’ preferences that will be hearing that appeal is
certainly in order. After all, many judicial studies have found that federal judges at
all levels make decisions based, at least in part, on their policy preferences (e.g. Segal
and Spaeth, 2002; Rowland and Carp, 1996). As such, strategic potential appellants
will likely account for the ideological preferences of the appellate court and how
those preferences compare to the district court judge that was involved in their case
disposition.
Since the courts hear cases in panels of three rather than immediately en banc,
litigants won’t know the identity of their decision makers when deciding whether to
appeal. And, in fact, depending on the circuit, the identities of the three judges
presiding over a case may not be known until right before oral argument in the case.2
2In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, “[t]he names of the judges on
each panel may be disclosed for a particular session seven (7) days in advance of the
session” (Internal Operating Procedures VIII(B) (2008). However, in, e.g., the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “the Court discloses merits
panels to counsel in the order setting the case for oral argument.” (Handbook of
Practice and Internal Procedures II.B.8(a) (2007).
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Thus, while predicting an appellate panel’s exact composition is largely impossible,
accounting for the possible preferences of that panel is critical for strategic litigants
considering an appeal.
Finally, rational/strategic actors considering whether to appeal are going to take
into account the cost and time invested in the case up to the point of appeal. For
these litigants, the cost of an appeal is really relative to what has already been spent
litigating the case to a losing outcome. This consideration means that for long,
complex cases in district courts, the likelihood of an appeal should increase. Since
these cases have already been so expensive to litigate, the cost of an appeal relative
to the potential of overturning the adverse judgment below is quite small and, thus,
likely worth it for many potential appellants.
4.1.2 Other Motivations for Appeal
Recently, Barclay (1999) developed a process-based explanation for the decision
to appeal from a trial court to an appellate court that argues that litigants will likely
choose to appeal because of procedural justice considerations. In particular, Barclay
(1999) posits that litigants, in deciding whether to appeal, are motivated by a desire
to be treated fairly in the legal system. This means, according to Barclay, that
litigants are not concerned about whether they win or lose but rather whether the
process that they are involved in while litigating their case is perceived to be fair.
A process-based focus has been utilized by others studying the judiciary. For
example, Tyler and Huo (2002) suggest that when legal processes are perceived as
fair, people are more likely to perceive the law as legitimate. Within trial courts,
parties will often choose to settle their cases rather than allow the court to control
the case outcome. While this settlement process, by necessity, involves compromise,
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the component of outcome control increases litigant satisfaction. Similarly, Lind et al.
(1990) find that litigants perceived trials, and particularly those involving a jury, as
dignified procedures that produced fair outcomes.
Settlement and even trial allude to a more “fair shot” of justice, enabling litigants
to come away from the judicial system, even as losers, with a sense of fairness and a
feeling that the legal system embodies legitimacy and provides an opportunity to air
their disputes. For these litigants, having their “day in court” in front of a “jury of
their peers” helped them perceive their litigative process as a fair, just, and legitimate
one, even without regard to the outcome of their case. Impact of this typology may
even be more critical for federal courts to embody, since this allows the judiciary to
maintain an influential, policy making role over American society and be perceived
as legitimate institutions – a characteristic necessary for judicial success and stability
(see Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998).
As argued by Baum (1981), a group of litigants are not motivated by achieving a
sense of fairness or strategic, economic success when deciding to appeal. Rather, these
individuals are involved in appeals, and litigation more generally, solely for advancing
political and institutional goals. As Baum (1981, 69) notes, some people “bring cases
to court or appeal adverse judgments because of a direct personal institutional interest
which they seek to advance. Whatever the negative consequences of litigation, people
see these as outweighed by what they may gain.” For these litigants, “gain” is usually
measured in a very long-term sense, meaning that they are content to wait for many
years and cases for change to arise in their political area of interest.
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4.2 Research Design and Data
To test these theories, I turn to a study of whether a losing litigant in federal
district court civil cases decides to appeal to the courts of appeals. Within civil cases
in the federal judicial hierarchy, the right to appeal from the trial court (district
court) to the intermediate appellate court (courts of appeals) is generally guaranteed
to litigants and is not subject to the discretionary, agenda settomg decision making
of the appellate court. This guaranteed right of appeal has been referred to by
the American Bar Association as “a fundamental element of procedural fairness as
generally understood in this country” (ABAs Commission on Standards of Judicial
Administration, cited in Dalton (1985, 66)). This thus stands in sharp contrast to
agenda setting at the U.S. Supreme Court, where that body votes on whether to
review cases on the merits. The right to an appeal from the federal trial courts
to the courts of appeals is also lauded, since the latter judicial body decides cases
with multiple judges. As Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek (2006, 1) argue, “[t]he
rationale underlying this system is that arbitrary decision making in collegial bodies
will be reduced by the moderating influence of alternative points of view.”
To conduct this study, I rely on a newly collected dataset of federal district court
and courts of appeals case information. In particular, I collect data on civil cases
terminated from 2000 to 2004 in 29 of the 94 federal district courts and, where
applicable, the notice of appeal to the courts of appeals following the termination of
the cases in the district courts. All of the twelve traditional, geographically-based
circuit courts except the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia are
represented. Table 4.1 details the districts included.
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1st Circuit 2nd Circuit 3rd Circuit 4th Circuit 5th Circuit 6th Circuit
DRI SDNY MDPA DMD NDTX NDOH
DME EDNY DDE EDVA EDLA EDMI
WDNC WDTN
7th Circuit 8th Circuit 9th Circuit 10th Circuit 11th Circuit
NDIL EDMO WDWA DCO MDFL
NDIN NDIA CDCA DKS NDFL
DSD DMT NDOK NDGA
MDAL
Table 4.1: The 29 federal district courts, arranged by their circuit, included
in the study.
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To identify the population of all cases that terminate in these district courts dur-
ing the years of my study, I turn to the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) Integrated
Databases, which includes standardized filing and termination information reported
from district court clerks of court for each case in my study. When the FJC’s Civil
Terminations Database is merged with its Appellate Terminations Database, the pres-
ence of any appeals and basic information relevant thereto is also available. To further
narrow the data down to the cases of interest, I rely on the filing party’s chosen cod-
ing of the case’s nature of suit (NOS). In particular, I focus here on cases involving
business, civil rights, and personal injury torts issues.3 For purposes of this study, I
draw a stratified random sample of 250 cases per district without an appeal and up
to 100 cases per district with an appeal.4 With these cases in hand, I gathered and
coded from PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic Records”) the case docket
and other relevant case documents for each case in the sample.
4.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is whether a litigant that loses in the district
court decides to appeal his or her case to the courts of appeals. In coding whether a
losing litigant in the district court decides to appeal, “loser” must be defined. As those
working in this area have noted, such a task is not objectively easy. As Kritzer and his
coauthors (1984, 1991, 1985) have argued, to truly understand who wins and loses, we
3The exact NOS codes are: civil rights cases (440, 442, 443, 444), personal injury
cases (310, 320, 340, 350, 360), and business-related cases (190, 820, 830, 840). The
NOS code is a issue area classification for a case. It is assigned to the case based on
the identification by the plaintiff’s attorney filing the case when he fills out his Civil
Cover Sheet.
4For the districts that had fewer than 100 appeals during the years of my sample,
I sampled the entire population of appealed cases.
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must also know the parties’ expectations upon filing their lawsuits (see also Barclay,
1999, 17). For the purposes of this study, a “loser” is generally apparent because he is
the only one that decides to appeal. However, for the relatively rare occasions where
multiple parties appeal the judgment or outcome of the district court and where the
judgment is mixed, the data were dealt with following the lead of Eisenberg (2004).5
In addition, in these mixed outcome cases, the original plaintiff is always assigned the
“loser” designation.
4.2.2 Strategic Variables
Litigant Status Difference is measured as the difference in the status of the
case’s original plaintiff and defendant. Within this study, litigant resources are as-
sessed in a similar fashion to that used in the long line of previous work on this
subject (see e.g., Black and Boyd, 2007; Brace and Hall, 2001; Collins, 2004; Farole,
1999; Rowland and Todd, 1991; Sheehan, 1992; Sheehan, Mishler and Songer, 1992;
Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 1999; Wheeler et al., 1987), with the following ordering:
(0) poor individual, (1) individual, (2) interest group and unions, (3) business, (4)
local government, (5) big business, (6) state government, and (7) federal government.
I code Ideological Difference to operationalize the potential appellant’s view
of the supervising circuit court’s ideology and her chances of achieving a different
outcome in that court compared to the district court. This variable represents the
absolute difference in the ideologies of the district court judge and the relevant circuit’s
median judge. To measure this difference, I collect the Judicial Common Space (JCS)
scores for these actors, a variable coded using the methodology described in Giles
5As Eisenberg (2004, 666) notes, “The matching of the district court and appel-
late court data attempts to eliminate duplicate case records, and adjusts for cross,
consolidated, and reopened appeals.”
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et al. (2001) and Epstein et al. (2007). In short, these scores are the Poole and
Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space score of the senator from a judge’s home
state (or average of the two senators) if that senator(s) is from the same party as
the appointing president. If neither senator is from the same party as the president,
the judge is assigned the Common Space score of the appointing president. The
resulting computed ideology scores range from -1 (the most liberal) to 1 (the most
conservative).
For the district court judges in my dataset, the JCS score is collected for the judge
presiding over the case at its district court termination leading to the potential appeal.
Where the assigned district court judge in the case is a magistrate judge rather than
an Article III district court judge, an additional step was taken to capture ideology.
Since magistrates are appointed to their position (for eight years) by a vote of the
active judges in their district, I code the ideology of these actors by taking the median
district court judge JCS score for the year that they assumed their position. For the
courts of appeals score, I collected the median circuit JCS scores (available from
Epstein et al. 2007) by year of the case’s district court termination.
To account for the length and complexity of the district court case prior to its
termination, I measure the time that it takes for the case to conclude, measured
in months. Months to District Court Termination, as expected, is positively
skewed, with most cases terminating within the first two years of filing.
4.2.3 Process and Political Motivation Variables
To account for the possibility that appeals are driven not (just) by strategic con-
siderations, but by procedural and fairness-minded ones as well, I include variables
for the type of case disposition in the district court. As noted above, cases terminat-
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ing by settlement are compromise-based, meaning that they tend to lead to greater
satisfaction with the process leading to case termination. As such, these cases should
rarely be appealed. Similarly, cases concluding through a jury trial should be per-
ceived as more legitimate than those ending in a judge-decided non-trial adjudication
or a bench trial. And, while bench trials and non-trial adjudications are each judge-
decided, the former should still produce more litigant satisfaction, since it allows for
the litigants to fully present their cases in open court after a complete discovery pro-
cess. Each of these types of district court case disposition methods is included in the
model below (while the baseline category of “other” dispositions is excluded).
Plaintiffs are responsible for initiating the civil lawsuit and, as a result, likely
invest a great deal emotionally (and financially) before and after filing. As a result,
they are likely to be less satisfied than defendants with the litigation process when it
leads to a defeat and thus more likely to appeal. Because of this, Plaintiff Loser
accounts for the presence of these actors as potential appellants.
Finally, to control for Baum’s (1981) theory that some litigants are solely mo-
tivated by long-term political gains when deciding whether to appeal, I include the
variable Interest Group Loser. The rationale here is that interest groups are the
most likely to be positioned and motivated to use courts for achieving their political
goals and are likely willing to have a long-term mindset when doing so.
4.3 Results
To model the losing district court litigant’s decision to appeal to courts of appeals,
I estimate a logistic regression model. The results of this estimation are presented in
Table 4.2. Notably, the model performs relatively well, predicting 73 percent correctly
and reducing error by approximately 5 percent.
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Ideological Difference -0.034
(0.15)
Litigant Status Difference -0.131*
(0.02)
Interest Group Loser 0.340
(1.13)
Plaintiff Loser 0.327*
(0.13)
District Court Settlement -0.651*
(0.10)
District Court Non-Trial Adjudication 1.682*
(0.12)
District Court Bench Trial 2.007*
(0.24)
District Court Jury Trial 1.479*
(0.18)
Months to District Court Termination 0.018*
(0.00)
Constant -3.024*
(0.11)
Log Likelihood -2472.234
Pseudo R2 0.211
Correctly Predicted 73%
Reduction in Error 5%
Observations 9927
Table 4.2: Logistic regression results for whether a case is appealed following
the termination of the case in the federal district courts. Statistical significance
is represented with * (p<0.05, two-tailed).
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All of the variables save Ideological Difference and Interest Group Loser
reach statistical significance at the standard level of 0.05. The failure of Ideological
Difference to reach statistical significance means that there is no support for the
theory that litigants are strategically accounting for the difference in ideology of the
district court judge who helped decide their case and the median circuit judge. For
Interest Group Loser, its lack of significance means that there is no evidence that
these groups are overwhelmingly filing political appeals without regard to their merit
or other strategic considerations.
To further detail the size of the effect of the significant variables, I simulate their
predicted probabilities and present them graphically. I turn first to the predicted
probability that a case will be appealed based on the method of case termination in
the district court, displayed in Figure 4.1. Recall that these variables are designed
to test whether litigants pursue appeals based on how satisfied they are with the
procedures and fairness of the district court litigation activity. As expected, cases
that end in settlement are very unlikely to be appealed, while those with non-trial
adjudications (like summary judgments) and bench and jury trials are much more
likely. Specifically, the mean predicted probability for a settled case to be appealed is
0.04. A case terminating with a jury trial has an appeal probability of 0.26, and a case
ending in a non-trial adjudication will be appealed with a 0.30 probability. Finally,
cases ending in a bench trial have the greatest likelihood of going up on appeal, doing
so with a probability of 0.37.
101
●●
●
●
●
District Court Method of Outcome
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 P
ro
ba
bil
ity
 o
f a
n 
Ap
pe
al
Settled Other Jury Non−Trial Bench
Trial Adjudication Trial
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Figure 4.1: The predicted probability that a case will have an appeal following
the termination of the case in the district court in different ways.
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While each of these later three is visibly significantly different in their likelihood
of producing an appeal from settlements, they are not necessarily different from one
another. To assess this, we have to compute the differences in the mean predicted
probability of generating an appeal (and the confidence interval around that mean)
for each termination type compared to the others. Figure 4.2 depicts the differences
in likelihood of an appeal for the three sets of pairs of these three variables. For each
pair, the effect indicates that one is more or less likely to lead to an appeal than the
other only if the confidence interval for the difference does not intersect with 0. As is
visible, this is only the case when jury trials are compared to bench trials, with jury
trials being, on average, 0.11 less likely to produce an appeal than bench trials. This
thus amounts to mixed support for the procedural fairness hypothesis.6
6Plaintiff Loser’s predicted probabilities are not presented graphically. The
presence of the variable leads to a very modest 0.0253 increase (confidence interval
on difference: [0.0052, 0.0454]) in the likelihood of a case’s appeal.
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Focusing next on the asymmetries in the status and resources of the parties,
Figure 4.3 reveals the likelihood of appeal as these asymmetries change. As is visible,
changes in this variable lead to large changes in the probability that a case will be
appealed, with district court cases pitting a very weak plaintiff against a very strong
defendant having the highest chance of being appealed. And, as expected, cases with
weak plaintiffs facing strong defendants are the most likely to have an appeal, with
this result likely being driven by the losing weak plaintiffs’ disregard for strategic
considerations while deciding whether to appeal. Equally statused parties are less
likely to appeal, but not non-trivially so. As noted above, this is likely the case
because of the large uncertainty of resources and chances of success present in cases
of this sort.
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Figure 4.3: The predicted probability that a case will have an appeal based on
the difference in the status of the plaintiff and defendant in the district court.
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Finally, the variable measuring the length and complexity of a district court case
up to termination, Months to Termination, has strong results. This variable indi-
cates that longer, more complex cases are much more likely to be appealed than those
that terminate relatively quickly. Indeed, cases terminating in the first few months
of filing have a predicted probability of being appealed of just over 0.20, but as that
number grows to over 10 years to termination, there is over an 80 percent chance
of appeal. This finding is consistent with with expectations that as more has been
invested in the litigation process, the less expensive (relatively speaking) pursuing an
appeal is, especially when accounting for the potential of reversal once the case is on
appeal.
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Figure 4.4: The predicted probability that a case will have an appeal based
on the time that it takes for the case to terminate in the district court.
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4.4 Discussion
The litigant’s decision to appeal from a federal district court to the courts of
appeals is an important one, since it has implications for the content of the legal
agenda for the federal appellate judicial system. As Songer, Cameron and Segal (1995,
1119) put it, “higher courts cannot exercise control over lower courts unless litigants
appeal lower-court decisions that are divergent from upper-court preferences.” And,
yet, little work, particularly empirical work, has examined what motivates a litigant
to appeal. Doing just that here, this study finds that litigants appeal their cases for
strategic and fairness reasons.
Indeed, strategic decisions to appeal are present based on asymmetries in the
status, resources, and experience of the parties as well as in lengthy and complex
cases. Settled cases, by their very nature producing a compromised, fair outcome, are
less likely that other cases to be appealed while jury trials are about 11 percent less
likely to be appealed that bench trials, indicating that those cases where a litigant
gets his day in court and does so in front of a jury of his peers are more likely to
produce an outcome that is perceived to be fair and undeserving of an appeal.
While these results are quite revealing, the lack of statistical significance on some
of the modeled variables may surprise some. In particular, the ideological difference
between the district court judge and the median circuit court judge is not significant.
While it is possible that potential appellants simply do not consider the ideological
preferences of the appellate court when deciding to appeal, it is also possible that
the measures utilized here are simply too preliminary to pick up strategic behavior.
Future work will attempt to better measure both the ideological direction of the case
outcome and the variation in circuit court ideology. Similarly, future iterations will
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operationalize the political motivation hypothesis to include not only interest group
litigants but other litigants that are represented in their lawsuit by interest groups.
These caveats aside, the findings here no doubt are important for our under-
standing of the lower federal courts. They also, however, have implications for the
appeals process and judicial and litigant decision making in other courts, particu-
larly those with a guaranteed, non-discretionary agenda setting process. This means
that the many state courts with intermediate appellate courts or even those with a
non-discretionary appeal to the state’s court of last resort likely face a similar story.
Looking at judicial institutions beyond the U.S., the same is also likely to be true.
Previous research already confirms that Galanter’s “haves” hypothesis often holds in
foreign courts (e.g., Haynie, 1994; Dotan, 1999; Flemming and Krutz, 2002; Haynie,
2003; Smyth, 2000). We should expect the rational litigant appeal behavior based on
status differentials to find support in these contexts as well.
This study also indicates, in a much broader sense, that when studying our courts,
the actions of many actors beyond the judges deciding cases are of critical importance.
While there has no doubt been work been an increase in the empirical study of alter-
native actors involved in the litigation process (like interest groups and the Solicitor
General), much of the scholarship remains judge-centric. As the present study reveals,
particularly when studying lower courts, this focus is likely misplaced.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
As discussed above, this dissertation, using newly collected data, studies the busi-
ness of district courts and the actions of federal litigants at three different stages.
Chapter 2 studies decision making at the district court, with a focus on both how
cases terminate and who wins in these trial courts. In Chapter 3, this project ex-
amines the impact that federal courts of appeals have on district court case winners
and termination methods after a case is appealed and then remanded to the district
court for a second proceeding. Finally, Chapter 4 studies why some litigants decide
to appeal following a loss in their district court proceedings. Viewed together, these
chapters reveal that litigants and judges along with hierarchical considerations are all
important in the decision making that takes place in these federal trial courts. While
this work goes a long way in revealing more about these important courts, it also
makes it clear that there is much left to be revealed about them in future projects.
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